Team incentives and leadership
We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism (team output is shared equally among team members) and a hierarchical mechanism (team output is allocated by a team l...
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| Format: | Article |
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Elsevier
2017
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| Online Access: | http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/1/dns_joep.pdf |
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nottingham-44193 |
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nottingham-441932018-06-26T12:41:00Z http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/ Team incentives and leadership Drouvelis, Michalis Nosenzo, Daniele Sefton, Martin We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism (team output is shared equally among team members) and a hierarchical mechanism (team output is allocated by a team leader). We find that output is higher when a leader has the power to allocate output, but this mechanism also generates large differences between earnings of leaders and other team members. When team members can choose how much of team output is to be shared equally and how much is to be allocated by a leader they tend to restrict the leader’s power to distributing less than half of the pie. Elsevier 2017-07-13 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/1/dns_joep.pdf Drouvelis, Michalis and Nosenzo, Daniele and Sefton, Martin (2017) Team incentives and leadership. Journal of Economic Psychology, 62 . pp. 173-185. ISSN 0167-4870 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487016304354 doi:10.1016/j.joep.2017.07.002 doi:10.1016/j.joep.2017.07.002 |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Local University |
| institution |
University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| building |
Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection |
Online Access |
| language |
English |
| description |
We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism (team output is shared equally among team members) and a hierarchical mechanism (team output is allocated by a team leader). We find that output is higher when a leader has the power to allocate output, but this mechanism also generates large differences between earnings of leaders and other team members. When team members can choose how much of team output is to be shared equally and how much is to be allocated by a leader they tend to restrict the leader’s power to distributing less than half of the pie. |
| format |
Article |
| author |
Drouvelis, Michalis Nosenzo, Daniele Sefton, Martin |
| spellingShingle |
Drouvelis, Michalis Nosenzo, Daniele Sefton, Martin Team incentives and leadership |
| author_facet |
Drouvelis, Michalis Nosenzo, Daniele Sefton, Martin |
| author_sort |
Drouvelis, Michalis |
| title |
Team incentives and leadership |
| title_short |
Team incentives and leadership |
| title_full |
Team incentives and leadership |
| title_fullStr |
Team incentives and leadership |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Team incentives and leadership |
| title_sort |
team incentives and leadership |
| publisher |
Elsevier |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44193/1/dns_joep.pdf |
| first_indexed |
2018-09-06T13:31:47Z |
| last_indexed |
2018-09-06T13:31:47Z |
| _version_ |
1610865135898853376 |