Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders
We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of th...
Main Authors: | Erkut, Hande, Nosenzo, Daniele, Sefton, Martin |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier
2015
|
Online Access: | http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29778/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29778/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29778/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29778/1/1-s2.0-S0165176515000737-main%20%281%29.pdf |
Similar Items
-
Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated
inspection game
by: Nosenzo, Daniele, et al.
Published: (2015) -
Promoting cooperation: the distribution of reward and punishment power
by: Nosenzo, Daniele, et al.
Published: (2014) -
Spectator consumption practices at the Roman games
by: Yuko, Minowa, et al.
Published: (2012) -
The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing
by: Gaechter, Simon, et al.
Published: (2017) -
Female spectators as customers at National Football League games
by: C. Keith, Harrison, et al.
Published: (2016)