Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game
We experimentally investigate a repeated “inspection game” where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive probabilities of shirking/inspecti...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
2015
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| Online Access: | http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29769/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29769/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29769/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29769/8/mnsc.2014.2124.pdf |