Executive Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking Behaviour: A Case Study in the UK Top Banking Institutions

Agency theory indicates that including equity in the managerial compensation packages can converge managers’ interest towards the expectation of shareholders, hence they will take more risks to achieve the optimisation of shareholder’s wealth. Even though the correlation between executive compensati...

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Main Author: Bun, Rothnita
Format: Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
Language:English
Published: 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/70468/
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author Bun, Rothnita
author_facet Bun, Rothnita
author_sort Bun, Rothnita
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description Agency theory indicates that including equity in the managerial compensation packages can converge managers’ interest towards the expectation of shareholders, hence they will take more risks to achieve the optimisation of shareholder’s wealth. Even though the correlation between executive compensation and firm risks have been continuously studied by many researchers in the finance field, there is still a controversy regarding their papers. Consequently, the purpose of this paper is to examine the correlation between executive equity-based compensation and firm risks with a case study of thirteen UK major banking institutions. Moreover, the study employs quantitative research methodology using secondary data for a regression analysis. The empirical findings indicate that the correlation between executive equity-based compensation and both total risk and unsystematic risk are insignificantly positive. However, it shows that the independent variable is negatively related to the systematic risk without being significant either. This result, which corresponds with both wealth transfer and risk aversion hypothesis, is consistent with several existing studies. Furthermore, the result also demonstrates significantly positive correlation of firm risks on the equity-based compensation, supporting the information asymmetry theory. In conclusion, the empirical results suggest that executive compensation should be designed with thorough strategies as there is an interrelation between compensation and degree of risk.
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spelling nottingham-704682023-07-06T11:48:54Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/70468/ Executive Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking Behaviour: A Case Study in the UK Top Banking Institutions Bun, Rothnita Agency theory indicates that including equity in the managerial compensation packages can converge managers’ interest towards the expectation of shareholders, hence they will take more risks to achieve the optimisation of shareholder’s wealth. Even though the correlation between executive compensation and firm risks have been continuously studied by many researchers in the finance field, there is still a controversy regarding their papers. Consequently, the purpose of this paper is to examine the correlation between executive equity-based compensation and firm risks with a case study of thirteen UK major banking institutions. Moreover, the study employs quantitative research methodology using secondary data for a regression analysis. The empirical findings indicate that the correlation between executive equity-based compensation and both total risk and unsystematic risk are insignificantly positive. However, it shows that the independent variable is negatively related to the systematic risk without being significant either. This result, which corresponds with both wealth transfer and risk aversion hypothesis, is consistent with several existing studies. Furthermore, the result also demonstrates significantly positive correlation of firm risks on the equity-based compensation, supporting the information asymmetry theory. In conclusion, the empirical results suggest that executive compensation should be designed with thorough strategies as there is an interrelation between compensation and degree of risk. 2022-09-08 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/70468/1/20343475_BUSI4020_2021_22.pdf Bun, Rothnita (2022) Executive Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking Behaviour: A Case Study in the UK Top Banking Institutions. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] Executive equity-based compensation Total risk Systematic risk Unsystematic risk
spellingShingle Executive equity-based compensation
Total risk
Systematic risk
Unsystematic risk
Bun, Rothnita
Executive Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking Behaviour: A Case Study in the UK Top Banking Institutions
title Executive Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking Behaviour: A Case Study in the UK Top Banking Institutions
title_full Executive Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking Behaviour: A Case Study in the UK Top Banking Institutions
title_fullStr Executive Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking Behaviour: A Case Study in the UK Top Banking Institutions
title_full_unstemmed Executive Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking Behaviour: A Case Study in the UK Top Banking Institutions
title_short Executive Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking Behaviour: A Case Study in the UK Top Banking Institutions
title_sort executive equity-based compensation and managerial risk-taking behaviour: a case study in the uk top banking institutions
topic Executive equity-based compensation
Total risk
Systematic risk
Unsystematic risk
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/70468/