The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese listed family-controlled firm

This research contributes to the corporate governance literature by examining the determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese family-controlled firms, using the data from 1,720 listed family firms and 8,403 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2018. In this research, the influences of different facto...

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Main Author: Chen, Minghui
Format: Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
Language:English
Published: 2020
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/62440/
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author Chen, Minghui
author_facet Chen, Minghui
author_sort Chen, Minghui
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description This research contributes to the corporate governance literature by examining the determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese family-controlled firms, using the data from 1,720 listed family firms and 8,403 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2018. In this research, the influences of different factors on the compensation of Chinese family CEO and non-family CEO were studied separately from the organizational level as well as the individual level. Through the investigation of the internal correlation between CEO compensation, corporate governance structure, and firm performance, this paper finds that CEO compensation is positively related to the accounting-based performance and several key corporate governance mechanisms, such as CEO duality and independence of the board. The indicators of CEO power also highly influence the design of the compensation package, for instance, the CEO compensation is increased with the percentage of CEO shareholdings. When comparing the impacts of different factors on the CEO compensation of the family CEOs and non-family CEOs, this paper finds that the compensation of external CEOs is often higher than that of family CEOs, and the family CEO compensation is more responsive to corporate performance. Most of the findings are consistent with the managerial power theory, the optimal contract theory, and the agency theory. This paper has provided some empirical evidence for further study in Chinese CEO compensation.
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spelling nottingham-624402023-04-13T12:55:11Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/62440/ The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese listed family-controlled firm Chen, Minghui This research contributes to the corporate governance literature by examining the determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese family-controlled firms, using the data from 1,720 listed family firms and 8,403 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2018. In this research, the influences of different factors on the compensation of Chinese family CEO and non-family CEO were studied separately from the organizational level as well as the individual level. Through the investigation of the internal correlation between CEO compensation, corporate governance structure, and firm performance, this paper finds that CEO compensation is positively related to the accounting-based performance and several key corporate governance mechanisms, such as CEO duality and independence of the board. The indicators of CEO power also highly influence the design of the compensation package, for instance, the CEO compensation is increased with the percentage of CEO shareholdings. When comparing the impacts of different factors on the CEO compensation of the family CEOs and non-family CEOs, this paper finds that the compensation of external CEOs is often higher than that of family CEOs, and the family CEO compensation is more responsive to corporate performance. Most of the findings are consistent with the managerial power theory, the optimal contract theory, and the agency theory. This paper has provided some empirical evidence for further study in Chinese CEO compensation. 2020-12-01 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/62440/2/20162355-BUSI4153%20UNUK-The%20determinants%20of%20CEO%20compensation%20in%20Chinese%20listed%20family-controlled%20firm.pdf Chen, Minghui (2020) The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese listed family-controlled firm. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] CEO compensation family-controlled firm firm performance corporate governance managerial power theory optimal contract theory agency theory
spellingShingle CEO compensation
family-controlled firm
firm performance
corporate governance
managerial power theory
optimal contract theory
agency theory
Chen, Minghui
The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese listed family-controlled firm
title The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese listed family-controlled firm
title_full The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese listed family-controlled firm
title_fullStr The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese listed family-controlled firm
title_full_unstemmed The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese listed family-controlled firm
title_short The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese listed family-controlled firm
title_sort determinants of ceo compensation in chinese listed family-controlled firm
topic CEO compensation
family-controlled firm
firm performance
corporate governance
managerial power theory
optimal contract theory
agency theory
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/62440/