The Effectiveness of Management Incentives in UK Based Private Equity Owned Companies

I analyse the effects of Sweet Equity and Salary on the performance of Private Equity (PE) owned firms between 2010 and 2020. My sample focuses on a peer group of similar industrially focused companies localised to the United Kingdom. My research documents that PE specific incentives, like sweet equ...

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Main Author: Gill, Michael
Format: Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
Language:English
Published: 2020
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/62134/
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author Gill, Michael
author_facet Gill, Michael
author_sort Gill, Michael
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description I analyse the effects of Sweet Equity and Salary on the performance of Private Equity (PE) owned firms between 2010 and 2020. My sample focuses on a peer group of similar industrially focused companies localised to the United Kingdom. My research documents that PE specific incentives, like sweet equity, and more general remuneration elicit significant positive effects on firm performance in PE owned companies. However, I find little evidence to suggest that private equity owned companies outperform a similar public peer group during the time period. My results raise the question as to whether Sweet Equity and other equity-based incentives produce their desired outcome, or whether other factors play a more significant role.
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format Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
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institution University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus
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language English
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spelling nottingham-621342022-12-22T13:03:35Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/62134/ The Effectiveness of Management Incentives in UK Based Private Equity Owned Companies Gill, Michael I analyse the effects of Sweet Equity and Salary on the performance of Private Equity (PE) owned firms between 2010 and 2020. My sample focuses on a peer group of similar industrially focused companies localised to the United Kingdom. My research documents that PE specific incentives, like sweet equity, and more general remuneration elicit significant positive effects on firm performance in PE owned companies. However, I find little evidence to suggest that private equity owned companies outperform a similar public peer group during the time period. My results raise the question as to whether Sweet Equity and other equity-based incentives produce their desired outcome, or whether other factors play a more significant role. 2020 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/62134/1/ECPENDING_4281160_BUSI4136_management%20incentives%20in%20private%20equity%20owned%20companies.pdf Gill, Michael (2020) The Effectiveness of Management Incentives in UK Based Private Equity Owned Companies. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)]
spellingShingle Gill, Michael
The Effectiveness of Management Incentives in UK Based Private Equity Owned Companies
title The Effectiveness of Management Incentives in UK Based Private Equity Owned Companies
title_full The Effectiveness of Management Incentives in UK Based Private Equity Owned Companies
title_fullStr The Effectiveness of Management Incentives in UK Based Private Equity Owned Companies
title_full_unstemmed The Effectiveness of Management Incentives in UK Based Private Equity Owned Companies
title_short The Effectiveness of Management Incentives in UK Based Private Equity Owned Companies
title_sort effectiveness of management incentives in uk based private equity owned companies
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/62134/