Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
We re-investigate the endogenous choice of price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) contract in the presence of a vertically related upstream market for input. We find that choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the two-part-tariff pricing contract is determined th...
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| Format: | Article |
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Elsevier
2016
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52149/ |
| _version_ | 1848798659165028352 |
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| author | Basak, Debasmita Wang, Leonard F.S. |
| author_facet | Basak, Debasmita Wang, Leonard F.S. |
| author_sort | Basak, Debasmita |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We re-investigate the endogenous choice of price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) contract in the presence of a vertically related upstream market for input. We find that choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the two-part-tariff pricing contract is determined through centralised Nash bargaining. We further show that the level of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot). |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:23:17Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-52149 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:23:17Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-521492020-05-04T17:29:37Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52149/ Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure Basak, Debasmita Wang, Leonard F.S. We re-investigate the endogenous choice of price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) contract in the presence of a vertically related upstream market for input. We find that choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the two-part-tariff pricing contract is determined through centralised Nash bargaining. We further show that the level of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot). Elsevier 2016-01-30 Article PeerReviewed Basak, Debasmita and Wang, Leonard F.S. (2016) Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure. Economics Letters, 138 . pp. 53-56. ISSN 0165-1765 Bargaining; Bertrand; Cournot; Two-part tariffs; Vertical pricing; Welfare https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515004929 doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.026 doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.026 |
| spellingShingle | Bargaining; Bertrand; Cournot; Two-part tariffs; Vertical pricing; Welfare Basak, Debasmita Wang, Leonard F.S. Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure |
| title | Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure |
| title_full | Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure |
| title_fullStr | Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure |
| title_full_unstemmed | Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure |
| title_short | Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure |
| title_sort | endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure |
| topic | Bargaining; Bertrand; Cournot; Two-part tariffs; Vertical pricing; Welfare |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52149/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52149/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52149/ |