Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance
Many contemporary compatibilists about free will and determinism are agnostic about whether determinism is true, yet do not doubt that we have free will. They are thus committed to the thesis that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. This paper explores the prospects for...
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| Format: | Article |
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Cambridge University Press
2018
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50622/ |
| _version_ | 1848798299291648000 |
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| author | Mackie, Penelope |
| author_facet | Mackie, Penelope |
| author_sort | Mackie, Penelope |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Many contemporary compatibilists about free will and determinism are agnostic about whether determinism is true, yet do not doubt that we have free will. They are thus committed to the thesis that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. This paper explores the prospects for this version of compatibilism, including its response to the argument (traditionally employed against incompatibilist accounts of free will) that indeterminism would introduce an element of randomness or chance or luck that is inimical to free will and moral responsibility. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:17:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-50622 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:17:34Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-506222020-05-04T19:44:36Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50622/ Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance Mackie, Penelope Many contemporary compatibilists about free will and determinism are agnostic about whether determinism is true, yet do not doubt that we have free will. They are thus committed to the thesis that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. This paper explores the prospects for this version of compatibilism, including its response to the argument (traditionally employed against incompatibilist accounts of free will) that indeterminism would introduce an element of randomness or chance or luck that is inimical to free will and moral responsibility. Cambridge University Press 2018-07-03 Article PeerReviewed Mackie, Penelope (2018) Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 82 . pp. 265-287. ISSN 1755-3555 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplements/article/compatibilism-indeterminism-and-chance/03A8D7687914494ADCE029C01D74FB67 doi:10.1017/S1358246118000140 doi:10.1017/S1358246118000140 |
| spellingShingle | Mackie, Penelope Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance |
| title | Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance |
| title_full | Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance |
| title_fullStr | Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance |
| title_full_unstemmed | Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance |
| title_short | Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance |
| title_sort | compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50622/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50622/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50622/ |