How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their representative support the policy. In equilibr...
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer
2014
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47271/ |
| _version_ | 1848797504589529088 |
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| author | Dahm, Matthias Dur, Robert Glazer, Amihai |
| author_facet | Dahm, Matthias Dur, Robert Glazer, Amihai |
| author_sort | Dahm, Matthias |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their representative support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, so each legislator who seeks the firm’s investment votes for the policy, though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy. And when votes reveal information about the district, the firm’s implicit promise or threat can be credible. Unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes, the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the low campaign contributions by special interests. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:04:56Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-47271 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:04:56Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Springer |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-472712020-05-04T16:46:09Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47271/ How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy Dahm, Matthias Dur, Robert Glazer, Amihai This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their representative support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, so each legislator who seeks the firm’s investment votes for the policy, though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy. And when votes reveal information about the district, the firm’s implicit promise or threat can be credible. Unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes, the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the low campaign contributions by special interests. Springer 2014-04-30 Article PeerReviewed Dahm, Matthias, Dur, Robert and Glazer, Amihai (2014) How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy. Public Choice, 159 (1-2). pp. 63-82. ISSN 1573-7101 Lobbying Voting Special interests Credibility https://link.springer.com/journal/11127/159/1/page/1 doi:10.1007/s11127-012-0016-z doi:10.1007/s11127-012-0016-z |
| spellingShingle | Lobbying Voting Special interests Credibility Dahm, Matthias Dur, Robert Glazer, Amihai How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy |
| title | How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy |
| title_full | How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy |
| title_fullStr | How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy |
| title_full_unstemmed | How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy |
| title_short | How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy |
| title_sort | how a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy |
| topic | Lobbying Voting Special interests Credibility |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47271/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47271/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47271/ |