Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

The paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann (2015). We then...

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Main Authors: Anesi, Vincent, Duggan, John
Format: Article
Published: Econometric Society 2017
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47225/
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author Anesi, Vincent
Duggan, John
author_facet Anesi, Vincent
Duggan, John
author_sort Anesi, Vincent
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description The paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann (2015). We then use this existence result to show that if a weak gradient restriction holds at an alternative, then when players are sufficiently patient, there is a continuum of equilibria with absorbing sets arbitrarily close to that alternative. A sufficient condition for our gradient restriction is that the gradients of all players' utilities are linearly independent at that alternative. When the dimensionality of the set of alternatives is high, this linear independence condition holds at almost all alternatives, and equilibrium absorbing sets are dense in the set of alternatives. This implies that constructive techniques, which are common in the literature, fail to identify many plausible outcomes in dynamic bargaining games.
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spelling nottingham-472252020-05-04T19:11:11Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47225/ Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games Anesi, Vincent Duggan, John The paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann (2015). We then use this existence result to show that if a weak gradient restriction holds at an alternative, then when players are sufficiently patient, there is a continuum of equilibria with absorbing sets arbitrarily close to that alternative. A sufficient condition for our gradient restriction is that the gradients of all players' utilities are linearly independent at that alternative. When the dimensionality of the set of alternatives is high, this linear independence condition holds at almost all alternatives, and equilibrium absorbing sets are dense in the set of alternatives. This implies that constructive techniques, which are common in the literature, fail to identify many plausible outcomes in dynamic bargaining games. Econometric Society 2017-10-09 Article PeerReviewed Anesi, Vincent and Duggan, John (2017) Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games. Theoretical Economics . ISSN 1555-7561 (In Press)
spellingShingle Anesi, Vincent
Duggan, John
Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
title Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
title_full Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
title_fullStr Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
title_full_unstemmed Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
title_short Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
title_sort existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47225/