A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting
This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period pro...
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| Format: | Article |
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Elsevier
2015
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29620/ |
| _version_ | 1848793814352789504 |
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| author | Dahm, Matthias Glazer, Amihai |
| author_facet | Dahm, Matthias Glazer, Amihai |
| author_sort | Dahm, Matthias |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust. But institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter's power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase a legislator's ability to resist exploitation. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:06:17Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-29620 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:06:17Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-296202020-05-04T20:07:45Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29620/ A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting Dahm, Matthias Glazer, Amihai This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust. But institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter's power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase a legislator's ability to resist exploitation. Elsevier 2015-08 Article PeerReviewed Dahm, Matthias and Glazer, Amihai (2015) A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 116 . pp. 465-480. ISSN 0167-2681 legislative bargaining distributive politics agenda setting http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726811500147X doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.012 doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.012 |
| spellingShingle | legislative bargaining distributive politics agenda setting Dahm, Matthias Glazer, Amihai A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting |
| title | A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting |
| title_full | A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting |
| title_fullStr | A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting |
| title_full_unstemmed | A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting |
| title_short | A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting |
| title_sort | carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting |
| topic | legislative bargaining distributive politics agenda setting |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29620/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29620/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29620/ |