Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality

Abstract: We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis’s account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalise common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasonin...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Cubitt, Robin P., Sugden, Robert
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press 2014
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/27776/
_version_ 1848793435947925504
author Cubitt, Robin P.
Sugden, Robert
author_facet Cubitt, Robin P.
Sugden, Robert
author_sort Cubitt, Robin P.
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description Abstract: We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis’s account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalise common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann (1987), arguing that the former avoids and diagnoses certain paradoxes to which the latter may give rise when extended in particular ways.
first_indexed 2025-11-14T19:00:16Z
format Article
id nottingham-27776
institution University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus
institution_category Local University
last_indexed 2025-11-14T19:00:16Z
publishDate 2014
publisher Cambridge University Press
recordtype eprints
repository_type Digital Repository
spelling nottingham-277762020-05-04T16:54:50Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/27776/ Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality Cubitt, Robin P. Sugden, Robert Abstract: We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis’s account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalise common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann (1987), arguing that the former avoids and diagnoses certain paradoxes to which the latter may give rise when extended in particular ways. Cambridge University Press 2014-11-01 Article PeerReviewed Cubitt, Robin P. and Sugden, Robert (2014) Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality. Economics and Philosophy, 30 (3). pp. 285-329. ISSN 0266-2671 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000339 doi:10.1017/S0266267114000339 doi:10.1017/S0266267114000339
spellingShingle Cubitt, Robin P.
Sugden, Robert
Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality
title Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality
title_full Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality
title_fullStr Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality
title_full_unstemmed Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality
title_short Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality
title_sort common reasoning in games: a lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/27776/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/27776/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/27776/