Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: CEO Stock Options and Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis

In the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis a significant amount of attention has been focused on the compensation practices of the financial sector. Due to their asymmetric payoff it has been argued that stock options created incentives for bank CEOs to pursue excessively risky strategies that resulte...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Tjong, Peter
Format: Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
Language:English
Published: 2010
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23928/
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author Tjong, Peter
author_facet Tjong, Peter
author_sort Tjong, Peter
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description In the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis a significant amount of attention has been focused on the compensation practices of the financial sector. Due to their asymmetric payoff it has been argued that stock options created incentives for bank CEOs to pursue excessively risky strategies that resulted in the crisis. This paper investigates whether CEO stock options influenced US bank performance during the Financial Crisis. No evidence is found that either CEO stock options or fixed salaries had a significant impact on bank share price performance during this period. This paper then moves on to review the regulation of executive compensation for TARP recipients in the US, discussing the shortcomings of these proposals and providing several alternative suggestions.
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spelling nottingham-239282018-02-16T18:01:10Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23928/ Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: CEO Stock Options and Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis Tjong, Peter In the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis a significant amount of attention has been focused on the compensation practices of the financial sector. Due to their asymmetric payoff it has been argued that stock options created incentives for bank CEOs to pursue excessively risky strategies that resulted in the crisis. This paper investigates whether CEO stock options influenced US bank performance during the Financial Crisis. No evidence is found that either CEO stock options or fixed salaries had a significant impact on bank share price performance during this period. This paper then moves on to review the regulation of executive compensation for TARP recipients in the US, discussing the shortcomings of these proposals and providing several alternative suggestions. 2010-09-22 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23928/1/Peter_Tjong_Dissertation.pdf Tjong, Peter (2010) Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: CEO Stock Options and Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] (Unpublished) Financial Crisis executive compensation risk agency theory banks
spellingShingle Financial Crisis
executive compensation
risk
agency theory
banks
Tjong, Peter
Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: CEO Stock Options and Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis
title Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: CEO Stock Options and Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis
title_full Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: CEO Stock Options and Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis
title_fullStr Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: CEO Stock Options and Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis
title_full_unstemmed Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: CEO Stock Options and Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis
title_short Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: CEO Stock Options and Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis
title_sort heads i win, tails you lose: ceo stock options and bank performance during the financial crisis
topic Financial Crisis
executive compensation
risk
agency theory
banks
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23928/