| Summary: | Abstract
"Mr 77% pay rise" (Mail on Sunday 2006) and "Fat cats pay soaring away" (Socialist worker online 2002) are some of the phrases making the headlines in the recent past criticising the level of remuneration received by directors at their place of work. Academic researchers have found there to be such a weak correlation between directors pay and their performance, that the remuneration received, in many cases, can no longer be justified.
As a consequence, various self-regulatory codes and regulations have been formed to tighten the link between pay and performance through "full disclosure" Ward 1998. These increased requirements will mean that directors will be more accountable for their actions when serving at such a high rank within public listed companies.
The purpose of this thesis is to study the impact of the various self-regulatory codes and regulations on the disclosure of long term incentives, mainly concentrating on executive share options and long term incentive plans.
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