The explanationist argument for moral realism
In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this ar...
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| Format: | Article |
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University of Calgary Press
2011
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1930/ |
| _version_ | 1848790687434145792 |
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| author | Sinclair, Neil |
| author_facet | Sinclair, Neil |
| author_sort | Sinclair, Neil |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not follow. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:16:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-1930 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:16:34Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | University of Calgary Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-19302020-05-04T20:24:34Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1930/ The explanationist argument for moral realism Sinclair, Neil In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not follow. University of Calgary Press 2011 Article NonPeerReviewed Sinclair, Neil (2011) The explanationist argument for moral realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41 (1). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1911-0820 http://www.canadianjournalofphilosophy.com |
| spellingShingle | Sinclair, Neil The explanationist argument for moral realism |
| title | The explanationist argument for moral realism |
| title_full | The explanationist argument for moral realism |
| title_fullStr | The explanationist argument for moral realism |
| title_full_unstemmed | The explanationist argument for moral realism |
| title_short | The explanationist argument for moral realism |
| title_sort | explanationist argument for moral realism |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1930/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1930/ |