| Summary: | Purpose – This paper combines the agency theory and efficiency wage theory to explore the
effects of relative compensation for executive directors with marketing experience on two
marketing outcomes (marketing efficiency and market share) and the moderating roles of
ownership type (private vs. state-owned enterprises) and market concentration in this process.
Methodology – 2,753 firm-year observations from Chinese listed companies (from 2010 to
2014) were retrieved from China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database
and analysed using firm random-effects with industry, year, and region fixed effects.
Findings – Relative compensation has a positive effect on both marketing efficiency and
market share, and these effects are moderated by ownership type and market concentration.
Specifically, the positive effect of relative compensation on marketing efficiency and market
share are stronger for central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compared to local SOEs and
private-owned enterprises (POEs) but the results are mixed for market concentration.
Research limitations/implications – This study shows that paying higher compensation to
the executive directors with marketing experience can enhance marketing performance, but
the data does not allow identification of the actual actions taken by these directors for this.
Practical implications: This study highlights the importance of appropriate compensation
for directors with marketing experience to motivate them to make better marketing decisions
to overcome the challenges posed by market concentration and agency conflicts.
Originality/value – This paper point outs the importance of having directors with marketing
experience and paying them suitable compensation to motivate them to be more effective.
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