Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. This paper explores the effect of policy burdens of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on senior executives’ excessive perks. The empirical analysis demonstrates that SOE policy burdens are significantly and positively correlated with senior executives’ excessive pe...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
ELSEVIER
2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/80725 |
| _version_ | 1848764258779660288 |
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| author | Jian, J. Li, H. Meng, Leah Zhao, C. |
| author_facet | Jian, J. Li, H. Meng, Leah Zhao, C. |
| author_sort | Jian, J. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | © 2020 Elsevier B.V.
This paper explores the effect of policy burdens of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on senior executives’ excessive perks. The empirical analysis demonstrates that SOE policy burdens are significantly and positively correlated with senior executives’ excessive perks, indicating that SOE policy burdens increase agency cost. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity. Moreover, we find the following evidences. Strategic policy burdens of SOEs have a significantly greater impact on their senior executives’ excessive perks, compared with social policy burdens. The positive impact of SOE policy burdens on excessive perks is significantly weaker in east China due to the higher degree of marketization. The central government's stricter supervision can also alleviate the positive correlation between policy burdens of centrally administered SOEs and senior executives’ excessive perks. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:16:30Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-80725 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:16:30Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | ELSEVIER |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-807252021-01-05T04:05:29Z Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises Jian, J. Li, H. Meng, Leah Zhao, C. Social Sciences Economics Business & Economics Policy burdens Excessive perks SOEs Marketization CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLITICAL CONNECTIONS FIRM PERFORMANCE AGENCY PROBLEMS OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT MARKET COSTS INCENTIVES ECONOMICS © 2020 Elsevier B.V. This paper explores the effect of policy burdens of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on senior executives’ excessive perks. The empirical analysis demonstrates that SOE policy burdens are significantly and positively correlated with senior executives’ excessive perks, indicating that SOE policy burdens increase agency cost. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity. Moreover, we find the following evidences. Strategic policy burdens of SOEs have a significantly greater impact on their senior executives’ excessive perks, compared with social policy burdens. The positive impact of SOE policy burdens on excessive perks is significantly weaker in east China due to the higher degree of marketization. The central government's stricter supervision can also alleviate the positive correlation between policy burdens of centrally administered SOEs and senior executives’ excessive perks. 2020 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/80725 10.1016/j.econmod.2020.05.002 English ELSEVIER restricted |
| spellingShingle | Social Sciences Economics Business & Economics Policy burdens Excessive perks SOEs Marketization CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLITICAL CONNECTIONS FIRM PERFORMANCE AGENCY PROBLEMS OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT MARKET COSTS INCENTIVES ECONOMICS Jian, J. Li, H. Meng, Leah Zhao, C. Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises |
| title | Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises |
| title_full | Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises |
| title_fullStr | Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises |
| title_short | Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises |
| title_sort | do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? evidence from china's stated-owned enterprises |
| topic | Social Sciences Economics Business & Economics Policy burdens Excessive perks SOEs Marketization CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLITICAL CONNECTIONS FIRM PERFORMANCE AGENCY PROBLEMS OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT MARKET COSTS INCENTIVES ECONOMICS |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/80725 |