Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises

Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China's stated-owned enterprises

© 2020 Elsevier B.V. This paper explores the effect of policy burdens of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on senior executives’ excessive perks. The empirical analysis demonstrates that SOE policy burdens are significantly and positively correlated with senior executives’ excessive pe...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jian, J., Li, H., Meng, Leah, Zhao, C.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: ELSEVIER 2020
Subjects:
Social Sciences
Economics
Business & Economics
Policy burdens
Excessive perks
SOEs
Marketization
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
FIRM PERFORMANCE
AGENCY PROBLEMS
OWNERSHIP
GOVERNMENT
MARKET
COSTS
INCENTIVES
ECONOMICS
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/80725

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/80725

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