Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality
© 2016 Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas (AECA). We examine the influence of multiple board directorships and boards’ committee memberships on three board supervisory outcomes: executive remuneration, external auditor opinion, and earnings management. The study uses a...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
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ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
2017
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76640 |
| _version_ | 1848763736859344896 |
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| author | Fernández Méndez, C. Arrondo García, R. Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize |
| author_facet | Fernández Méndez, C. Arrondo García, R. Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize |
| author_sort | Fernández Méndez, C. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | © 2016 Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas (AECA). We examine the influence of multiple board directorships and boards’ committee memberships on three board supervisory outcomes: executive remuneration, external auditor opinion, and earnings management. The study uses a panel of 122 non-financial companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange over the period 2004–2011. Our results show that firms with busy directors offer low executive remuneration and present a low probability of a qualified audit opinion. Furthermore, the results indicate that firms with overlap directors exhibit a higher probability of receiving a qualified audit opinion. Additionally, we find evidence that the overcommitment effects of busy and overlap directors are more evident for large firms. Overall, our findings suggest that busy (overlap) directors are beneficial (detrimental) to the monitoring capability of the board in the Spanish context. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:08:12Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-76640 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:08:12Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-766402019-10-24T05:49:59Z Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality Fernández Méndez, C. Arrondo García, R. Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Social Sciences Business, Finance Business & Economics Board Executive remuneration Busy directors Overlap directors Audit opinion earnings management QUALIFIED AUDIT OPINIONS EARNINGS MANAGEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FIRM PERFORMANCE COMPENSATION COMMITTEES ABNORMAL ACCRUALS CEO COMPENSATION BOARD COMMITTEES TOO BUSY MEMBERSHIP © 2016 Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas (AECA). We examine the influence of multiple board directorships and boards’ committee memberships on three board supervisory outcomes: executive remuneration, external auditor opinion, and earnings management. The study uses a panel of 122 non-financial companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange over the period 2004–2011. Our results show that firms with busy directors offer low executive remuneration and present a low probability of a qualified audit opinion. Furthermore, the results indicate that firms with overlap directors exhibit a higher probability of receiving a qualified audit opinion. Additionally, we find evidence that the overcommitment effects of busy and overlap directors are more evident for large firms. Overall, our findings suggest that busy (overlap) directors are beneficial (detrimental) to the monitoring capability of the board in the Spanish context. 2017 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76640 10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345 English ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD restricted |
| spellingShingle | Social Sciences Business, Finance Business & Economics Board Executive remuneration Busy directors Overlap directors Audit opinion earnings management QUALIFIED AUDIT OPINIONS EARNINGS MANAGEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FIRM PERFORMANCE COMPENSATION COMMITTEES ABNORMAL ACCRUALS CEO COMPENSATION BOARD COMMITTEES TOO BUSY MEMBERSHIP Fernández Méndez, C. Arrondo García, R. Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality |
| title | Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality |
| title_full | Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality |
| title_fullStr | Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality |
| title_short | Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality |
| title_sort | monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality |
| topic | Social Sciences Business, Finance Business & Economics Board Executive remuneration Busy directors Overlap directors Audit opinion earnings management QUALIFIED AUDIT OPINIONS EARNINGS MANAGEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FIRM PERFORMANCE COMPENSATION COMMITTEES ABNORMAL ACCRUALS CEO COMPENSATION BOARD COMMITTEES TOO BUSY MEMBERSHIP |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76640 |