Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality

Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality

© 2016 Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas (AECA). We examine the influence of multiple board directorships and boards’ committee memberships on three board supervisory outcomes: executive remuneration, external auditor opinion, and earnings management. The study uses a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Fernández Méndez, C., Arrondo García, R., Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD 2017
Subjects:
Social Sciences
Business, Finance
Business & Economics
Board
Executive remuneration
Busy directors
Overlap directors
Audit opinion
earnings management
QUALIFIED AUDIT OPINIONS
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FIRM PERFORMANCE
COMPENSATION COMMITTEES
ABNORMAL ACCRUALS
CEO COMPENSATION
BOARD COMMITTEES
TOO BUSY
MEMBERSHIP
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76640

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76640

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