How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?
© 2017 AFAANZ We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity-linked pay and exhibit higher pay-performance (delta) and pay-risk (vega) sensitivities. Our...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
WILEY
2019
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76638 |
| _version_ | 1848763736367562752 |
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| author | Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Wong, P.H. Benson, K. |
| author_facet | Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Wong, P.H. Benson, K. |
| author_sort | Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | © 2017 AFAANZ We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity-linked pay and exhibit higher pay-performance (delta) and pay-risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity-linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:08:12Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-76638 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:08:12Z |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publisher | WILEY |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-766382019-10-24T05:48:19Z How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives? Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Wong, P.H. Benson, K. Social Sciences Business, Finance Business & Economics CEO Incentives Busy directors Overlap directors EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES PROPENSITY SCORE BOARD STRUCTURE FIRM DETERMINANTS OWNERSHIP COMMITTEES BIAS © 2017 AFAANZ We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity-linked pay and exhibit higher pay-performance (delta) and pay-risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity-linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost. 2019 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76638 10.1111/acfi.12272 English WILEY restricted |
| spellingShingle | Social Sciences Business, Finance Business & Economics CEO Incentives Busy directors Overlap directors EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES PROPENSITY SCORE BOARD STRUCTURE FIRM DETERMINANTS OWNERSHIP COMMITTEES BIAS Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Wong, P.H. Benson, K. How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives? |
| title | How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives? |
| title_full | How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives? |
| title_fullStr | How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives? |
| title_full_unstemmed | How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives? |
| title_short | How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives? |
| title_sort | how do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to ceo pay structure and incentives? |
| topic | Social Sciences Business, Finance Business & Economics CEO Incentives Busy directors Overlap directors EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES PROPENSITY SCORE BOARD STRUCTURE FIRM DETERMINANTS OWNERSHIP COMMITTEES BIAS |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76638 |