The use of non-verifialble information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts

Subjective, non-verifiable information (such as satisfaction rating) is often used to supplement objective, verifiable information (such as financial numbers) in contracting. Empirical research finds that non-verifiable information can be used in contracting as a subjective performance measure or as...

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Main Author: Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
Format: Journal Article
Published: Scientific Research Publishing 2016
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/53650
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author Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
author_facet Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
author_sort Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description Subjective, non-verifiable information (such as satisfaction rating) is often used to supplement objective, verifiable information (such as financial numbers) in contracting. Empirical research finds that non-verifiable information can be used in contracting as a subjective performance measure or as subjective weighting on an objective performance measure. The differences between the two options have not yet been thoroughly explored analytically. This paper considers a multi-task setting where the non-verifiable performance signal provides incremental information about an aspect of the agent’s action. The research finds that when the agent has unlimited liability, both contracting schemes deliver the same payoff to the principal. However, the principal may strictly prefer a subjective weighting scheme in a setting where the agent has limited liability.
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-536502017-10-26T06:21:19Z The use of non-verifialble information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts Adithipyangkul, Pattarin Subjective, non-verifiable information (such as satisfaction rating) is often used to supplement objective, verifiable information (such as financial numbers) in contracting. Empirical research finds that non-verifiable information can be used in contracting as a subjective performance measure or as subjective weighting on an objective performance measure. The differences between the two options have not yet been thoroughly explored analytically. This paper considers a multi-task setting where the non-verifiable performance signal provides incremental information about an aspect of the agent’s action. The research finds that when the agent has unlimited liability, both contracting schemes deliver the same payoff to the principal. However, the principal may strictly prefer a subjective weighting scheme in a setting where the agent has limited liability. 2016 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/53650 10.4236/tel.2016.62026 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Scientific Research Publishing fulltext
spellingShingle Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
The use of non-verifialble information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts
title The use of non-verifialble information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts
title_full The use of non-verifialble information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts
title_fullStr The use of non-verifialble information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts
title_full_unstemmed The use of non-verifialble information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts
title_short The use of non-verifialble information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts
title_sort use of non-verifialble information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/53650