Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features
We use a sample of 964 executive directors representing 354 Singapore publicly listed firms to examine linkage between firm performance and cash-based bonus payments. As a pooled OLS regression model may hide different models that characterize subsets of observations we use latent class analysis to...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Published: |
Virtus interpress
2005
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/19434 |
| _version_ | 1848750032836100096 |
|---|---|
| author | Van der Zahn, J-L. Singh, Inderpal Brown, Alistair |
| author_facet | Van der Zahn, J-L. Singh, Inderpal Brown, Alistair |
| author_sort | Van der Zahn, J-L. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We use a sample of 964 executive directors representing 354 Singapore publicly listed firms to examine linkage between firm performance and cash-based bonus payments. As a pooled OLS regression model may hide different models that characterize subsets of observations we use latent class analysis to further examine the data and to identify more specifically the influence of corporate governance features. Our latent class analysis results indicate that remuneration committees with members having their interests better aligned with shareholders (such as presence of a significant owner) appear more likely to consider the incremental value of tying executive director compensation to intellectual capital performance. Remuneration committees with a lower risk of influence from managerial power were also found to be more likely to support a compensation linkage for executive directors to intellectual capital performance. The influence of the remuneration committee features is evident for both entrepreneurial and traditional firms. Overall, our findings are consistent with both the optimal-contract pricing and managerial power views of executive compensation setting. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T07:30:23Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-19434 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T07:30:23Z |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | Virtus interpress |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-194342017-01-30T12:13:48Z Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features Van der Zahn, J-L. Singh, Inderpal Brown, Alistair executive compensation remuneration committee corporate governance We use a sample of 964 executive directors representing 354 Singapore publicly listed firms to examine linkage between firm performance and cash-based bonus payments. As a pooled OLS regression model may hide different models that characterize subsets of observations we use latent class analysis to further examine the data and to identify more specifically the influence of corporate governance features. Our latent class analysis results indicate that remuneration committees with members having their interests better aligned with shareholders (such as presence of a significant owner) appear more likely to consider the incremental value of tying executive director compensation to intellectual capital performance. Remuneration committees with a lower risk of influence from managerial power were also found to be more likely to support a compensation linkage for executive directors to intellectual capital performance. The influence of the remuneration committee features is evident for both entrepreneurial and traditional firms. Overall, our findings are consistent with both the optimal-contract pricing and managerial power views of executive compensation setting. 2005 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/19434 Virtus interpress fulltext |
| spellingShingle | executive compensation remuneration committee corporate governance Van der Zahn, J-L. Singh, Inderpal Brown, Alistair Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features |
| title | Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features |
| title_full | Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features |
| title_fullStr | Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features |
| title_full_unstemmed | Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features |
| title_short | Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features |
| title_sort | intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features |
| topic | executive compensation remuneration committee corporate governance |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/19434 |