The Responders’ Gender Stereotypes Modulate the Strategic Decision-Making of Proposers Playing the Ultimatum Game

Despite the wealth of studies investigating factors affecting decisions, not much is known about the impact of stereotypical beliefs on strategic economic decision-making. In the present study, we used the ultimatum game paradigm to investigate how participants playing as proposer modulate their str...

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Main Authors:	Fabre, Eve F., Causse, Mickael, Pesciarelli, Francesca, Cacciari, Cristina
Format:	Online
Language:	English
Published:	Frontiers Media S.A. 2016
Online Access:	https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4724784/

id	pubmed-4724784
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	pubmed-47247842016-01-31 The Responders’ Gender Stereotypes Modulate the Strategic Decision-Making of Proposers Playing the Ultimatum Game Fabre, Eve F. Causse, Mickael Pesciarelli, Francesca Cacciari, Cristina Psychology Despite the wealth of studies investigating factors affecting decisions, not much is known about the impact of stereotypical beliefs on strategic economic decision-making. In the present study, we used the ultimatum game paradigm to investigate how participants playing as proposer modulate their strategic economic behavior, according to their game counterparts’ stereotypical identity (i.e., responders). The latter were introduced to the participants using occupational role nouns stereotypically marked with gender paired with feminine or masculine proper names (e.g., linguist-Anna; economist-David; economist-Cristina; linguist-Leonardo). When playing with male-stereotyped responders, proposers quickly applied the equity rule, behaving fairly, while they adopted a strategic behavior with responders characterized by female stereotypes. They were also longer to make their offers to female than to male responders but both kinds of responders received comparable offers, suggesting a greater cognitive effort to treat females as equally as males. The present study explicitly demonstrates that gender stereotypical information affect strategic economic decision-making and highlights a possible evolution of gender discrimination into a more insidious discrimination toward individuals with female characteristics. Frontiers Media S.A. 2016-01-25 /pmc/articles/PMC4724784/ /pubmed/26834684 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00012 Text en Copyright © 2016 Fabre, Causse, Pesciarelli and Cacciari. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
repository_type	Open Access Journal
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	US National Center for Biotechnology Information
building	NCBI PubMed
collection	Online Access
language	English
format	Online
author	Fabre, Eve F. Causse, Mickael Pesciarelli, Francesca Cacciari, Cristina
spellingShingle	Fabre, Eve F. Causse, Mickael Pesciarelli, Francesca Cacciari, Cristina The Responders’ Gender Stereotypes Modulate the Strategic Decision-Making of Proposers Playing the Ultimatum Game
author_facet	Fabre, Eve F. Causse, Mickael Pesciarelli, Francesca Cacciari, Cristina
author_sort	Fabre, Eve F.
title	The Responders’ Gender Stereotypes Modulate the Strategic Decision-Making of Proposers Playing the Ultimatum Game
title_short	The Responders’ Gender Stereotypes Modulate the Strategic Decision-Making of Proposers Playing the Ultimatum Game
title_full	The Responders’ Gender Stereotypes Modulate the Strategic Decision-Making of Proposers Playing the Ultimatum Game
title_fullStr	The Responders’ Gender Stereotypes Modulate the Strategic Decision-Making of Proposers Playing the Ultimatum Game
title_full_unstemmed	The Responders’ Gender Stereotypes Modulate the Strategic Decision-Making of Proposers Playing the Ultimatum Game
title_sort	responders’ gender stereotypes modulate the strategic decision-making of proposers playing the ultimatum game
description	Despite the wealth of studies investigating factors affecting decisions, not much is known about the impact of stereotypical beliefs on strategic economic decision-making. In the present study, we used the ultimatum game paradigm to investigate how participants playing as proposer modulate their strategic economic behavior, according to their game counterparts’ stereotypical identity (i.e., responders). The latter were introduced to the participants using occupational role nouns stereotypically marked with gender paired with feminine or masculine proper names (e.g., linguist-Anna; economist-David; economist-Cristina; linguist-Leonardo). When playing with male-stereotyped responders, proposers quickly applied the equity rule, behaving fairly, while they adopted a strategic behavior with responders characterized by female stereotypes. They were also longer to make their offers to female than to male responders but both kinds of responders received comparable offers, suggesting a greater cognitive effort to treat females as equally as males. The present study explicitly demonstrates that gender stereotypical information affect strategic economic decision-making and highlights a possible evolution of gender discrimination into a more insidious discrimination toward individuals with female characteristics.
publisher	Frontiers Media S.A.
publishDate	2016
url	https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4724784/
_version_	1613527673537036288

The Responders’ Gender Stereotypes Modulate the Strategic Decision-Making of Proposers Playing the Ultimatum Game

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