Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme

The existing certificateless signcryption schemes were designed mainly based on the traditional public key cryptography, in which the security relies on the hard problems, such as factor decomposition and discrete logarithm. However, these problems will be easily solved by the quantum computing. So...

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Main Authors: Li, Huixian, Chen, Xubao, Pang, Liaojun, Shi, Weisong
Format: Online
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science 2013
Online Access:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3673999/
id pubmed-3673999
recordtype oai_dc
spelling pubmed-36739992013-08-21 Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme Li, Huixian Chen, Xubao Pang, Liaojun Shi, Weisong Research Article The existing certificateless signcryption schemes were designed mainly based on the traditional public key cryptography, in which the security relies on the hard problems, such as factor decomposition and discrete logarithm. However, these problems will be easily solved by the quantum computing. So the existing certificateless signcryption schemes are vulnerable to the quantum attack. Multivariate public key cryptography (MPKC), which can resist the quantum attack, is one of the alternative solutions to guarantee the security of communications in the post-quantum age. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a new construction of the certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme (CLMSC) based on MPKC. The new scheme inherits the security of MPKC, which can withstand the quantum attack. Multivariate quadratic polynomial operations, which have lower computation complexity than bilinear pairing operations, are employed in signcrypting a message for a certain number of receivers in our scheme. Security analysis shows that our scheme is a secure MPKC-based scheme. We proved its security under the hardness of the Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and its unforgeability under the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) assumption in the random oracle model. The analysis results show that our scheme also has the security properties of non-repudiation, perfect forward secrecy, perfect backward secrecy and public verifiability. Compared with the existing schemes in terms of computation complexity and ciphertext length, our scheme is more efficient, which makes it suitable for terminals with low computation capacity like smart cards. Public Library of Science 2013-06-05 /pmc/articles/PMC3673999/ /pubmed/23967037 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0049141 Text en © 2013 Li et al http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited.
repository_type Open Access Journal
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution US National Center for Biotechnology Information
building NCBI PubMed
collection Online Access
language English
format Online
author Li, Huixian
Chen, Xubao
Pang, Liaojun
Shi, Weisong
spellingShingle Li, Huixian
Chen, Xubao
Pang, Liaojun
Shi, Weisong
Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme
author_facet Li, Huixian
Chen, Xubao
Pang, Liaojun
Shi, Weisong
author_sort Li, Huixian
title Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme
title_short Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme
title_full Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme
title_fullStr Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme
title_full_unstemmed Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme
title_sort quantum attack-resistent certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme
description The existing certificateless signcryption schemes were designed mainly based on the traditional public key cryptography, in which the security relies on the hard problems, such as factor decomposition and discrete logarithm. However, these problems will be easily solved by the quantum computing. So the existing certificateless signcryption schemes are vulnerable to the quantum attack. Multivariate public key cryptography (MPKC), which can resist the quantum attack, is one of the alternative solutions to guarantee the security of communications in the post-quantum age. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a new construction of the certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme (CLMSC) based on MPKC. The new scheme inherits the security of MPKC, which can withstand the quantum attack. Multivariate quadratic polynomial operations, which have lower computation complexity than bilinear pairing operations, are employed in signcrypting a message for a certain number of receivers in our scheme. Security analysis shows that our scheme is a secure MPKC-based scheme. We proved its security under the hardness of the Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and its unforgeability under the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) assumption in the random oracle model. The analysis results show that our scheme also has the security properties of non-repudiation, perfect forward secrecy, perfect backward secrecy and public verifiability. Compared with the existing schemes in terms of computation complexity and ciphertext length, our scheme is more efficient, which makes it suitable for terminals with low computation capacity like smart cards.
publisher Public Library of Science
publishDate 2013
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3673999/
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