Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games
In this paper we study the influence of random network fluctuations on the behavior of evolutionary games on Barabási–Albert networks. This network class has been shown to promote cooperation on social dilemmas such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift games when the population network i...
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| Format: | Online |
| Language: | English |
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Public Library of Science
2011
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| Online Access: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3198448/ |
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pubmed-3198448 |
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oai_dc |
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pubmed-31984482011-10-28 Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games Antonioni, Alberto Tomassini, Marco Research Article In this paper we study the influence of random network fluctuations on the behavior of evolutionary games on Barabási–Albert networks. This network class has been shown to promote cooperation on social dilemmas such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift games when the population network is fixed. Here we introduce exogenous random fluctuations of the network links through several noise models, and we investigate the evolutionary dynamics comparing them with the known static network case. The results we obtain show that even a moderate amount of random noise on the network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is the same as the agents' strategy revision rate. The results appear to be robust since they are essentially the same whatever the type of the exogenous noise. Besides, it turns out that random network noise is more important than strategy noise in suppressing cooperation. Thus, even in the more favorable situation of accumulated payoff in which links have no cost, the mere presence of random external network fluctuations act as a powerful limitation to the attainment of high levels of cooperation. Public Library of Science 2011-10-19 /pmc/articles/PMC3198448/ /pubmed/22039416 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0025555 Text en Antonioni, Tomassini. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited. |
| repository_type |
Open Access Journal |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
US National Center for Biotechnology Information |
| building |
NCBI PubMed |
| collection |
Online Access |
| language |
English |
| format |
Online |
| author |
Antonioni, Alberto Tomassini, Marco |
| spellingShingle |
Antonioni, Alberto Tomassini, Marco Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games |
| author_facet |
Antonioni, Alberto Tomassini, Marco |
| author_sort |
Antonioni, Alberto |
| title |
Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games |
| title_short |
Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games |
| title_full |
Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games |
| title_fullStr |
Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games |
| title_sort |
network fluctuations hinder cooperation in evolutionary games |
| description |
In this paper we study the influence of random network fluctuations on the behavior of evolutionary games on Barabási–Albert networks. This network class has been shown to promote cooperation on social dilemmas such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift games when the population network is fixed. Here we introduce exogenous random fluctuations of the network links through several noise models, and we investigate the evolutionary dynamics comparing them with the known static network case. The results we obtain show that even a moderate amount of random noise on the network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is the same as the agents' strategy revision rate. The results appear to be robust since they are essentially the same whatever the type of the exogenous noise. Besides, it turns out that random network noise is more important than strategy noise in suppressing cooperation. Thus, even in the more favorable situation of accumulated payoff in which links have no cost, the mere presence of random external network fluctuations act as a powerful limitation to the attainment of high levels of cooperation. |
| publisher |
Public Library of Science |
| publishDate |
2011 |
| url |
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3198448/ |
| _version_ |
1611482458436403200 |