Mythical Thinking, Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination
This article focuses on some principles for understanding. By taking Anna Mikulak’s article “Mismatches between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ ways of knowing and their contributions to public understanding of science” (IPBS 2011) as a point of departure, the idea of demarcation criteria for scie...
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| Format: | Online |
| Language: | English |
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Springer-Verlag
2011
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| Online Access: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3100503/ |
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pubmed-3100503 |
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pubmed-31005032011-07-14 Mythical Thinking, Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination Hroar Klempe, Sven Regular Paper This article focuses on some principles for understanding. By taking Anna Mikulak’s article “Mismatches between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ ways of knowing and their contributions to public understanding of science” (IPBS 2011) as a point of departure, the idea of demarcation criteria for scientific and non-scientific discourses is addressed. Yet this is juxtaposed with mythical thinking, which is supposed to be the most salient trait of non-scientific discourses. The author demonstrates how the most widespread demarcation criterion, the criterion of verification, is self-contradictory, not only when it comes to logic, but also in the achievement of isolating natural sciences from other forms of knowledge. According to Aristotle induction is a rhetorical device and as far as scientific statements are based on inductive inferences, they are relying on humanities, which rhetoric is a part of. Yet induction also has an empirical component by being based on sense-impressions, which is not a part of the rhetoric, but the psychology. Also the myths are understood in a rhetorical (Lévi-Strauss) and a psychological (Cassirer) perspective. Thus it is argued that both scientific and non-scientific discourses can be mythical. Springer-Verlag 2011-04-02 2011-06 /pmc/articles/PMC3100503/ /pubmed/21461605 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12124-011-9160-0 Text en © The Author(s) 2011 |
| repository_type |
Open Access Journal |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
US National Center for Biotechnology Information |
| building |
NCBI PubMed |
| collection |
Online Access |
| language |
English |
| format |
Online |
| author |
Hroar Klempe, Sven |
| spellingShingle |
Hroar Klempe, Sven Mythical Thinking, Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination |
| author_facet |
Hroar Klempe, Sven |
| author_sort |
Hroar Klempe, Sven |
| title |
Mythical Thinking, Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination |
| title_short |
Mythical Thinking, Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination |
| title_full |
Mythical Thinking, Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination |
| title_fullStr |
Mythical Thinking, Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Mythical Thinking, Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination |
| title_sort |
mythical thinking, scientific discourses and research dissemination |
| description |
This article focuses on some principles for understanding. By taking Anna Mikulak’s article “Mismatches between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ ways of knowing and their contributions to public understanding of science” (IPBS 2011) as a point of departure, the idea of demarcation criteria for scientific and non-scientific discourses is addressed. Yet this is juxtaposed with mythical thinking, which is supposed to be the most salient trait of non-scientific discourses. The author demonstrates how the most widespread demarcation criterion, the criterion of verification, is self-contradictory, not only when it comes to logic, but also in the achievement of isolating natural sciences from other forms of knowledge. According to Aristotle induction is a rhetorical device and as far as scientific statements are based on inductive inferences, they are relying on humanities, which rhetoric is a part of. Yet induction also has an empirical component by being based on sense-impressions, which is not a part of the rhetoric, but the psychology. Also the myths are understood in a rhetorical (Lévi-Strauss) and a psychological (Cassirer) perspective. Thus it is argued that both scientific and non-scientific discourses can be mythical. |
| publisher |
Springer-Verlag |
| publishDate |
2011 |
| url |
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3100503/ |
| _version_ |
1611455391585009664 |