Determinants of Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees for Listed UK Companies
This study mainly examines the characteristics of financial distress, earnings management, executive remuneration and low balling simultaneously determine audit and non-audit fees. Single-equation models are utilized in this research for both audit and non-audit fee models by using a sample of liste...
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Format: | Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) |
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2010
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Online Access: | http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23686/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23686/1/ZhuYan.pdf |
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nottingham-236862018-02-01T04:46:41Z http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23686/ Determinants of Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees for Listed UK Companies Zhu, Yan This study mainly examines the characteristics of financial distress, earnings management, executive remuneration and low balling simultaneously determine audit and non-audit fees. Single-equation models are utilized in this research for both audit and non-audit fee models by using a sample of listed UK companies in FTSE for the period 2001-2010. The empirical results reveal that financial distress has negative association with non-audit fees, and cannot fully explain audit fee model; earnings management is negatively related to the audit and non-audit fees; executive remuneration is significantly and positively associated with audit fees, but fails to explain the non-audit fee model; low balling is significantly and negatively corresponding with both audit and non-audit fees. Keywords: Audit Fees; Non-audit Fees; Financial Distress; Earnings Management; Executive Remuneration; Low Balling 2010 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23686/1/ZhuYan.pdf Zhu, Yan (2010) Determinants of Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees for Listed UK Companies. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] (Unpublished) |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Local University |
institution |
University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
building |
Nottingham Research Data Repository |
collection |
Online Access |
language |
English |
description |
This study mainly examines the characteristics of financial distress, earnings management, executive remuneration and low balling simultaneously determine audit and non-audit fees. Single-equation models are utilized in this research for both audit and non-audit fee models by using a sample of listed UK companies in FTSE for the period 2001-2010.
The empirical results reveal that financial distress has negative association with non-audit fees, and cannot fully explain audit fee model; earnings management is negatively related to the audit and non-audit fees; executive remuneration is significantly and positively associated with audit fees, but fails to explain the non-audit fee model; low balling is significantly and negatively corresponding with both audit and non-audit fees.
Keywords: Audit Fees; Non-audit Fees; Financial Distress; Earnings Management; Executive Remuneration; Low Balling |
format |
Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) |
author |
Zhu, Yan |
spellingShingle |
Zhu, Yan Determinants of Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees for Listed UK Companies |
author_facet |
Zhu, Yan |
author_sort |
Zhu, Yan |
title |
Determinants of Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees for Listed UK Companies |
title_short |
Determinants of Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees for Listed UK Companies |
title_full |
Determinants of Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees for Listed UK Companies |
title_fullStr |
Determinants of Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees for Listed UK Companies |
title_full_unstemmed |
Determinants of Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees for Listed UK Companies |
title_sort |
determinants of audit fees and non-audit fees for listed uk companies |
publishDate |
2010 |
url |
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23686/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23686/1/ZhuYan.pdf |
first_indexed |
2018-09-06T11:20:58Z |
last_indexed |
2018-09-06T11:20:58Z |
_version_ |
1610856905622683648 |