Moral expressivism and sentential negation
This paper advances three necessary conditions on a successful account of sentential negation. First, the ability to explain the constancy of sentential meaning across negated and unnegated contexts (the Fregean Condition). Second, the ability to explain why sentences and their negations are inconsi...
Main Author: | Sinclair, Neil |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Springer
2011
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Online Access: | http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1597/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1597/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1597/ http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1597/1/Moral_Expressivism_and_Sentential_Negation_-_website_version.pdf |
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