http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned
"Global threats of terrorism, drug-smuggling and other crimes have led to a significant increase in research on game theory for security. Game theory provides a sound mathematical approach to deploy limited security resources to maximize their effectiveness. A typical approach is to randomize security schedules to avoid predictability, with the randomization using artificial intelligence techniques to take into account the importance of different targets and potential adversary reactions. This book distills the forefront of this research to provide the first and only study of long-term deployed applications of game theory for security for key organizations such as the Los Angeles International Airport police and the US Federal Air Marshals Service. The author and his research group draw from their extensive experience working with security officials to intelligently allocate limited security resources to protect targets, outlining the applications of these algorithms in research and the real world"-- Provided by publisher
1. Introduction and overview of security games -- 2. LAX: terror target: the history, the reason, the countermeasureion -- 3. Maritime transportation system security and the use of game theory: a perfect match to address operational and tactical concerns -- 4. Deployed ARMOR protection: the application of a game theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles International Airport -- 5. IRIS: a tool for strategic security allocation in transportation networks -- 6. GUARDS: game theoretic security allocation on a national scale -- 7. Coordinating randomized policies for increasing security of agent systems -- 8. Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games -- 9. Security games with arbitrary schedules: a branch-and-price approach -- 10. Effective solutions for real-world Stackelberg games: when agents must deal with human uncertainties -- 12. Stackelberg versus Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness --13. Evaluating deployed decision-support systems for security: challenges, arguments, and approaches
Includes bibliographical references (p. 297-310) and index