Conflict and cooperation in multi-ethnic states [ institutional incentives, myths and counter-balancing
"This book develops a model that explains how and why interethnic bargains between rival groups can erode given different institutional configurations. It is hypothesized that interethnic conflict is more likely in countries where political institutions fail to insulate the political hegemony o...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
London ; New York :
Routledge ,
c2008
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| Series: | Asian security studies
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | MyiLibrary NetLibrary |
| Summary: | "This book develops a model that explains how and why interethnic bargains between rival groups can erode given different institutional configurations. It is hypothesized that interethnic conflict is more likely in countries where political institutions fail to insulate the political hegemony of traditionally dominant ethnic communities and redistributive programs fail to improve the economic position of ethnic majorities. In such cases, outbidding strategies by more extreme ethnic leaders are more successful and violence becomes more likely. This book will be of interest to students of ethnic conflict, Asian politics, and security studies."--BOOK JACKET. |
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| Item Description: | Description based on print version record |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (viii, 189 p.) : ill. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| ISBN: | 0203945603 (electronic bk.) 9780203945605 (electronic bk.) |