Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers

In this paper, we investigate the security of the KATAN family of block ciphers against differential fault attacks. KATAN consists of three variants with 32, 48 and 64-bit block sizes, called KATAN32,KATAN48 and KATAN64, respectively. All three variants have the same key length of 80 bits. We assume...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Abdul Latip, Shekh Faisal
Format: Conference or Workshop Item
Language:English
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://eprints.utem.edu.my/id/eprint/3181/
http://eprints.utem.edu.my/id/eprint/3181/1/Paper62.pdf
_version_ 1848886950393544704
author Abdul Latip, Shekh Faisal
author_facet Abdul Latip, Shekh Faisal
author_sort Abdul Latip, Shekh Faisal
building UTeM Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description In this paper, we investigate the security of the KATAN family of block ciphers against differential fault attacks. KATAN consists of three variants with 32, 48 and 64-bit block sizes, called KATAN32,KATAN48 and KATAN64, respectively. All three variants have the same key length of 80 bits. We assume a single-bit fault injection model where the adversary is supposed to be able to corrupt a single random bit of the internal state of the cipher and this fault injection process can be repeated (by resetting the cipher); i.e., the faults are transient rather than permanent. First, we determine suitable rounds for effective fault injections by analyzing distributions of low-degree (mainly, linear and quadratic) polynomial equations obtainable using the cube and extended cube attack techniques. Then, we show how to identify the exact position of faulty bits within the internal state by precomputing difference characteristics for each bit position at a given round and comparing these characteristics with ciphertext differences (XOR of faulty and non-faulty ciphertexts) during the online phase of the attack. The complexity of our attack on KATAN32 is 2^59 computations and about 115 fault injections. For KATAN48 and KATAN64, the attack requires 2^55 computations (for both variants), while the required number of fault injections is 211 and 278, respectively.
first_indexed 2025-11-15T19:46:38Z
format Conference or Workshop Item
id utem-3181
institution Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka
institution_category Local University
language English
last_indexed 2025-11-15T19:46:38Z
publishDate 2012
recordtype eprints
repository_type Digital Repository
spelling utem-31812015-05-28T02:33:42Z http://eprints.utem.edu.my/id/eprint/3181/ Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers Abdul Latip, Shekh Faisal QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science In this paper, we investigate the security of the KATAN family of block ciphers against differential fault attacks. KATAN consists of three variants with 32, 48 and 64-bit block sizes, called KATAN32,KATAN48 and KATAN64, respectively. All three variants have the same key length of 80 bits. We assume a single-bit fault injection model where the adversary is supposed to be able to corrupt a single random bit of the internal state of the cipher and this fault injection process can be repeated (by resetting the cipher); i.e., the faults are transient rather than permanent. First, we determine suitable rounds for effective fault injections by analyzing distributions of low-degree (mainly, linear and quadratic) polynomial equations obtainable using the cube and extended cube attack techniques. Then, we show how to identify the exact position of faulty bits within the internal state by precomputing difference characteristics for each bit position at a given round and comparing these characteristics with ciphertext differences (XOR of faulty and non-faulty ciphertexts) during the online phase of the attack. The complexity of our attack on KATAN32 is 2^59 computations and about 115 fault injections. For KATAN48 and KATAN64, the attack requires 2^55 computations (for both variants), while the required number of fault injections is 211 and 278, respectively. 2012-04-02 Conference or Workshop Item PeerReviewed application/pdf en http://eprints.utem.edu.my/id/eprint/3181/1/Paper62.pdf Abdul Latip, Shekh Faisal (2012) Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers. In: Information Security Practice and Experience 2012 (ISPEC 2012), 9 - 12 April 2012, Hangzhou, China. http://www.springerlink.com/content/d56776k687xl3g35/about/
spellingShingle QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Abdul Latip, Shekh Faisal
Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers
title Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers
title_full Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers
title_fullStr Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers
title_full_unstemmed Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers
title_short Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers
title_sort fault analysis of the katan family of block ciphers
topic QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
url http://eprints.utem.edu.my/id/eprint/3181/
http://eprints.utem.edu.my/id/eprint/3181/
http://eprints.utem.edu.my/id/eprint/3181/1/Paper62.pdf