Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size?

Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size?

Shareholding size is a poor proxy for corporate control. At best it reflects an investor’s wealth relative to other shareholders and, most importantly, the distribution of rights to a company’s worth and the related exposure to risk. Shareholding size does not actually show an investor’s strength...

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Main Authors: Bajuri, Norkhairul Hafiz, Chakravarty, Shanti, Hashim, Noor Hazarina
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Asian Academy of Management (AAM) 2014
Subjects:
HD28-70 Management. Industrial Management
Online Access:http://eprints.usm.my/39943/
http://eprints.usm.my/39943/1/AAMJAF_10-1-4-G1_%2875-94%29.pdf
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author Bajuri, Norkhairul Hafiz
Chakravarty, Shanti
Hashim, Noor Hazarina
author_facet Bajuri, Norkhairul Hafiz
Chakravarty, Shanti
Hashim, Noor Hazarina
author_sort Bajuri, Norkhairul Hafiz
building USM Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description Shareholding size is a poor proxy for corporate control. At best it reflects an investor’s wealth relative to other shareholders and, most importantly, the distribution of rights to a company’s worth and the related exposure to risk. Shareholding size does not actually show an investor’s strength in corporate control. As an alternative, this paper espouses the merits of the voting power concept and promotes two indices associated with it: the Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index. This paper further introduces a new framework that compares the strength of corporate control against the size of corporate shareholding. Illustrating this idea using a group of government-linked companies (GLCs), this study yielded two possible ways in which the government can consolidate its control.
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institution Universiti Sains Malaysia
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language English
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publishDate 2014
publisher Asian Academy of Management (AAM)
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spelling usm-399432018-04-05T04:48:37Z http://eprints.usm.my/39943/ Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size? Bajuri, Norkhairul Hafiz Chakravarty, Shanti Hashim, Noor Hazarina HD28-70 Management. Industrial Management Shareholding size is a poor proxy for corporate control. At best it reflects an investor’s wealth relative to other shareholders and, most importantly, the distribution of rights to a company’s worth and the related exposure to risk. Shareholding size does not actually show an investor’s strength in corporate control. As an alternative, this paper espouses the merits of the voting power concept and promotes two indices associated with it: the Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index. This paper further introduces a new framework that compares the strength of corporate control against the size of corporate shareholding. Illustrating this idea using a group of government-linked companies (GLCs), this study yielded two possible ways in which the government can consolidate its control. Asian Academy of Management (AAM) 2014 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en http://eprints.usm.my/39943/1/AAMJAF_10-1-4-G1_%2875-94%29.pdf Bajuri, Norkhairul Hafiz and Chakravarty, Shanti and Hashim, Noor Hazarina (2014) Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size? Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance, 10 (1). pp. 1-20. ISSN 1823-4992 http://web.usm.my/journal/aamjaf/10-1-4-2014.html
spellingShingle HD28-70 Management. Industrial Management
Bajuri, Norkhairul Hafiz
Chakravarty, Shanti
Hashim, Noor Hazarina
Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size?
title Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size?
title_full Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size?
title_fullStr Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size?
title_full_unstemmed Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size?
title_short Analysis Of Corporate Control: Can The Voting Power Index Outshine Shareholding Size?
title_sort analysis of corporate control: can the voting power index outshine shareholding size?
topic HD28-70 Management. Industrial Management
url http://eprints.usm.my/39943/
http://eprints.usm.my/39943/
http://eprints.usm.my/39943/1/AAMJAF_10-1-4-G1_%2875-94%29.pdf

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