Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field
Common modulus attack is one of the various homomorphic attacks based on homomorphism nature of cryptosystems. This type of attack requires a plaintext encrypted under same modulus while two encryption keys are relatively prime to each other. In this paper, an investigation was carried out to evalua...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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International Association for Cryptologic Research
2018
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| Online Access: | http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/ http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/1/LUCAS.pdf |
| _version_ | 1848857275550138368 |
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| author | Koo, Lee Feng Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana Kwan, Yee Min Yiu, Pang Hung Wong, Tze Jin |
| author_facet | Koo, Lee Feng Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana Kwan, Yee Min Yiu, Pang Hung Wong, Tze Jin |
| author_sort | Koo, Lee Feng |
| building | UPM Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Common modulus attack is one of the various homomorphic attacks based on homomorphism nature of cryptosystems. This type of attack requires a plaintext encrypted under same modulus while two encryption keys are relatively prime to each other. In this paper, an investigation was carried out to evaluate the nature of a homomorphic attack on the Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field. The attack can be proven by using extend Euclidean algorithm together with composite and reverse functions of Lucas and Fibonacci sequences. Results showed that common modulus attack can be used to obtain the original plaintexts. Thus, it is dangerous to send a plaintext to two different users using same modulus. Sender must use different modulus to communicate with two different users. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-15T11:54:58Z |
| format | Article |
| id | upm-73441 |
| institution | Universiti Putra Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-15T11:54:58Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | International Association for Cryptologic Research |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | upm-734412020-11-10T07:24:23Z http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/ Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field Koo, Lee Feng Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana Kwan, Yee Min Yiu, Pang Hung Wong, Tze Jin Common modulus attack is one of the various homomorphic attacks based on homomorphism nature of cryptosystems. This type of attack requires a plaintext encrypted under same modulus while two encryption keys are relatively prime to each other. In this paper, an investigation was carried out to evaluate the nature of a homomorphic attack on the Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field. The attack can be proven by using extend Euclidean algorithm together with composite and reverse functions of Lucas and Fibonacci sequences. Results showed that common modulus attack can be used to obtain the original plaintexts. Thus, it is dangerous to send a plaintext to two different users using same modulus. Sender must use different modulus to communicate with two different users. International Association for Cryptologic Research 2018 Article PeerReviewed text en http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/1/LUCAS.pdf Koo, Lee Feng and Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila and Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana and Kwan, Yee Min and Yiu, Pang Hung and Wong, Tze Jin (2018) Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field. International Journal of Cryptology Research, 8 (2). pp. 1-10. ISSN 0933-2790 https://mscr.org.my/data/journal/journal-20190806143649.pdf |
| spellingShingle | Koo, Lee Feng Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana Kwan, Yee Min Yiu, Pang Hung Wong, Tze Jin Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field |
| title | Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field |
| title_full | Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field |
| title_fullStr | Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field |
| title_full_unstemmed | Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field |
| title_short | Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field |
| title_sort | common modulus attack against lucas based el-gamal cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field |
| url | http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/ http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/ http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/1/LUCAS.pdf |