Agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in Malaysia

Although the agency theory has been widely used across a variety of corporate finance concepts for the past three decades, little work has been undertaken with regard to how the agency theory could be used to explain simultaneous interrelation among internal solutions for Agency problem....

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Main Authors: Ghasemi, Maziar, Ab Razak, Nazrul Hisyam, Hassan, Taufiq
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universiti Putra Malaysia Press 2015
Online Access:http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/43675/
http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/43675/1/Agency%20Problem%2C%20Managerial%20Incentive%20and%20Financial.pdf
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author Ghasemi, Maziar
Ab Razak, Nazrul Hisyam
Hassan, Taufiq
author_facet Ghasemi, Maziar
Ab Razak, Nazrul Hisyam
Hassan, Taufiq
author_sort Ghasemi, Maziar
building UPM Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description Although the agency theory has been widely used across a variety of corporate finance concepts for the past three decades, little work has been undertaken with regard to how the agency theory could be used to explain simultaneous interrelation among internal solutions for Agency problem. In addition, no general consensus has emerged after many years of investigation and scholars can often disagree about the same empirical evidence. Among other, potential endogeneity of the agency mechanisms, as well as cultural and structural differences between developed and developing markets, has been stated to cause the complexity of corporate governance around the world. This article reviews the theoretical and empirical literature addressing causal effects of managerial incentives and financial controlling instrument due to agency problem. At the same time, the article aims to improve the understanding of how these instruments affect each other. The main part of the discussion is related to the evaluation of theoretical aspects of internal Agency solution and their interrelations, as well as the experiential studies in different countries. As such, specification of Malaysian market is surveyed separately to highlight the need for multi-theoretic process and interrelation effects in future research on corporate agency problems in the Malaysian context.
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spelling upm-436752018-05-15T02:26:40Z http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/43675/ Agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in Malaysia Ghasemi, Maziar Ab Razak, Nazrul Hisyam Hassan, Taufiq Although the agency theory has been widely used across a variety of corporate finance concepts for the past three decades, little work has been undertaken with regard to how the agency theory could be used to explain simultaneous interrelation among internal solutions for Agency problem. In addition, no general consensus has emerged after many years of investigation and scholars can often disagree about the same empirical evidence. Among other, potential endogeneity of the agency mechanisms, as well as cultural and structural differences between developed and developing markets, has been stated to cause the complexity of corporate governance around the world. This article reviews the theoretical and empirical literature addressing causal effects of managerial incentives and financial controlling instrument due to agency problem. At the same time, the article aims to improve the understanding of how these instruments affect each other. The main part of the discussion is related to the evaluation of theoretical aspects of internal Agency solution and their interrelations, as well as the experiential studies in different countries. As such, specification of Malaysian market is surveyed separately to highlight the need for multi-theoretic process and interrelation effects in future research on corporate agency problems in the Malaysian context. Universiti Putra Malaysia Press 2015 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/43675/1/Agency%20Problem%2C%20Managerial%20Incentive%20and%20Financial.pdf Ghasemi, Maziar and Ab Razak, Nazrul Hisyam and Hassan, Taufiq (2015) Agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in Malaysia. Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities, 23 (spec.). pp. 39-58. ISSN 0128-7702; ESSN: 2231-8534 http://www.pertanika.upm.edu.my/Pertanika%20PAPERS/JSSH%20Vol.%2023%20(S)%20Sep.%202015/03%20JSSH%20Vol%2023%20(S)%20Sept%202015_pg39-58%20(JSSH(S)-0034-2015).pdf
spellingShingle Ghasemi, Maziar
Ab Razak, Nazrul Hisyam
Hassan, Taufiq
Agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in Malaysia
title Agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in Malaysia
title_full Agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in Malaysia
title_fullStr Agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in Malaysia
title_full_unstemmed Agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in Malaysia
title_short Agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in Malaysia
title_sort agency problem, managerial incentive and financial controlling instrument: a brief review for agenda study in malaysia
url http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/43675/
http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/43675/
http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/43675/1/Agency%20Problem%2C%20Managerial%20Incentive%20and%20Financial.pdf