On the security defects of an image encryption scheme
This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme and points out the following problems: (1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; (2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey K<...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2009
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://scholars.utp.edu.my/id/eprint/457/ http://scholars.utp.edu.my/id/eprint/457/1/paper.pdf |
| Summary: | This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme and points out the following problems: (1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; (2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey K<sub>10</sub> can be guessed with a smaller computational complexity than that of the simple brute-force attack; (3) given at most 128 chosen plain-images, a chosen-plaintext attack can possibly break the following part of the secret key: fenced(K<sub>i</sub> mod 128)<sub>i = 4</sub><sup>10</sup>, which works very well when K<sub>10</sub> is not too large; (4) when K<sub>10</sub> is relatively small, a known-plaintext attack can be carried out with only one known plain-image to recover some visual information of any other plain-images encrypted by the same key. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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