A game theoretic model of green technology rivalry
The optimal research and development of green technology taxes (subsidies) is analyzed in a three-stage game model of an international Cournot duopoly. The governments simultaneously determine the environmental policies in the first stage. In the second stage, the firms simultaneously determine the...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
2013
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| Online Access: | http://journalarticle.ukm.my/8125/ http://journalarticle.ukm.my/8125/1/7271-18727-1-SM.pdf |
| _version_ | 1848811703247044608 |
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| author | Normizan Bakar, Rusmani Musa, Bakti Hasan Basri, |
| author_facet | Normizan Bakar, Rusmani Musa, Bakti Hasan Basri, |
| author_sort | Normizan Bakar, |
| building | UKM Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | The optimal research and development of green technology taxes (subsidies) is analyzed in a three-stage game model
of an international Cournot duopoly. The governments simultaneously determine the environmental policies in the first stage. In the second stage, the firms simultaneously determine the green technology levels and set the output in the third stage. One firm exists in a home country and one firm exists in a foreign country that produce homogenous goods and export to the third-market country. By assuming that the green technology involves cost-increasing research and development (R&D), the present study finds that green technology is not overused to minimize the total production costs. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T23:50:37Z |
| format | Article |
| id | oai:generic.eprints.org:8125 |
| institution | Universiti Kebangasaan Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T23:50:37Z |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publisher | Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | oai:generic.eprints.org:81252016-12-14T06:46:18Z http://journalarticle.ukm.my/8125/ A game theoretic model of green technology rivalry Normizan Bakar, Rusmani Musa, Bakti Hasan Basri, The optimal research and development of green technology taxes (subsidies) is analyzed in a three-stage game model of an international Cournot duopoly. The governments simultaneously determine the environmental policies in the first stage. In the second stage, the firms simultaneously determine the green technology levels and set the output in the third stage. One firm exists in a home country and one firm exists in a foreign country that produce homogenous goods and export to the third-market country. By assuming that the green technology involves cost-increasing research and development (R&D), the present study finds that green technology is not overused to minimize the total production costs. Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 2013 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en http://journalarticle.ukm.my/8125/1/7271-18727-1-SM.pdf Normizan Bakar, and Rusmani Musa, and Bakti Hasan Basri, (2013) A game theoretic model of green technology rivalry. Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia, 47 (2). pp. 123-127. ISSN 0127-1962 http://ejournals.ukm.my/jem/index |
| spellingShingle | Normizan Bakar, Rusmani Musa, Bakti Hasan Basri, A game theoretic model of green technology rivalry |
| title | A game theoretic model of green technology rivalry |
| title_full | A game theoretic model of green technology rivalry |
| title_fullStr | A game theoretic model of green technology rivalry |
| title_full_unstemmed | A game theoretic model of green technology rivalry |
| title_short | A game theoretic model of green technology rivalry |
| title_sort | game theoretic model of green technology rivalry |
| url | http://journalarticle.ukm.my/8125/ http://journalarticle.ukm.my/8125/ http://journalarticle.ukm.my/8125/1/7271-18727-1-SM.pdf |