A security upgrade on the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem
Due to the Nguyen’s attack, the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) encryption scheme, simply referred to as GGH cryptosystem, is considered broken. The GGH cryptosystem was initially addressed as the first practical latticebased cryptosystem. Once the cryptosystem is implemented in a lattice dimensi...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
2020
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| Online Access: | http://journalarticle.ukm.my/15485/ http://journalarticle.ukm.my/15485/1/25.pdf |
| _version_ | 1848813811658653696 |
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| author | Arif Mandangan, Hailiza Kamarulhaili, Muhammad Asyraf Asbullah, |
| author_facet | Arif Mandangan, Hailiza Kamarulhaili, Muhammad Asyraf Asbullah, |
| author_sort | Arif Mandangan, |
| building | UKM Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Due to the Nguyen’s attack, the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) encryption scheme, simply referred to as GGH
cryptosystem, is considered broken. The GGH cryptosystem was initially addressed as the first practical latticebased cryptosystem. Once the cryptosystem is implemented in a lattice dimension of 300 and above, its inventors
was conjectured that the cryptosystem is intractable. This conjecture was based on thorough security analyses on the
cryptosystem against some powerful attacks. This conjecture became more concrete when all initial efforts for decrypting
the published GGH Internet Challenges were failed. However, a novel strategy by the Nguyen’s attack for simplifying
the underlying Closest-Vector Problem (CVP) instance that arose from the cryptosystem, had successfully decrypted
almost all the challenges and eventually made the cryptosystem being considered broken. Therefore, the Nguyen’s
attack is considered as a fatal attack on the GGH cryptosystem. In this paper, we proposed a countermeasure to
combat the Nguyen’s attack. By implementing the proposed countermeasure, we proved that the simplification of the
underlying CVP instance could be prevented. We also proved that, the upgraded GGH cryptosystem remains practical
where the decryption could be done without error. We are optimistic that, the upgraded GGH cryptosystem could make
a remarkable return into the mainstream discussion of the lattice-based cryptography |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-15T00:24:07Z |
| format | Article |
| id | oai:generic.eprints.org:15485 |
| institution | Universiti Kebangasaan Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-15T00:24:07Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | oai:generic.eprints.org:154852020-10-30T05:35:58Z http://journalarticle.ukm.my/15485/ A security upgrade on the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem Arif Mandangan, Hailiza Kamarulhaili, Muhammad Asyraf Asbullah, Due to the Nguyen’s attack, the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) encryption scheme, simply referred to as GGH cryptosystem, is considered broken. The GGH cryptosystem was initially addressed as the first practical latticebased cryptosystem. Once the cryptosystem is implemented in a lattice dimension of 300 and above, its inventors was conjectured that the cryptosystem is intractable. This conjecture was based on thorough security analyses on the cryptosystem against some powerful attacks. This conjecture became more concrete when all initial efforts for decrypting the published GGH Internet Challenges were failed. However, a novel strategy by the Nguyen’s attack for simplifying the underlying Closest-Vector Problem (CVP) instance that arose from the cryptosystem, had successfully decrypted almost all the challenges and eventually made the cryptosystem being considered broken. Therefore, the Nguyen’s attack is considered as a fatal attack on the GGH cryptosystem. In this paper, we proposed a countermeasure to combat the Nguyen’s attack. By implementing the proposed countermeasure, we proved that the simplification of the underlying CVP instance could be prevented. We also proved that, the upgraded GGH cryptosystem remains practical where the decryption could be done without error. We are optimistic that, the upgraded GGH cryptosystem could make a remarkable return into the mainstream discussion of the lattice-based cryptography Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 2020-06 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en http://journalarticle.ukm.my/15485/1/25.pdf Arif Mandangan, and Hailiza Kamarulhaili, and Muhammad Asyraf Asbullah, (2020) A security upgrade on the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem. Sains Malaysiana, 49 (6). pp. 1471-1478. ISSN 0126-6039 http://www.ukm.my/jsm/malay_journals/jilid49bil6_2020/KandunganJilid49Bil6_2020.html |
| spellingShingle | Arif Mandangan, Hailiza Kamarulhaili, Muhammad Asyraf Asbullah, A security upgrade on the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem |
| title | A security upgrade on the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem |
| title_full | A security upgrade on the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem |
| title_fullStr | A security upgrade on the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem |
| title_full_unstemmed | A security upgrade on the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem |
| title_short | A security upgrade on the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem |
| title_sort | security upgrade on the ggh lattice-based cryptosystem |
| url | http://journalarticle.ukm.my/15485/ http://journalarticle.ukm.my/15485/ http://journalarticle.ukm.my/15485/1/25.pdf |