Presentism as dynamic existence
This thesis proposes and defends a novel version of presentism called Dynamic Existence Presentism (DEP). DEP is founded on two main principles: there are no (discrete) times and temporal existence is fundamentally dynamic. Rejecting the notion of time as a series of static slices, DEP builds on Mer...
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| Format: | Thesis (University of Nottingham only) |
| Language: | English |
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2024
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/78602/ |
| _version_ | 1848801091937894400 |
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| author | Langsdale, Kerry |
| author_facet | Langsdale, Kerry |
| author_sort | Langsdale, Kerry |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This thesis proposes and defends a novel version of presentism called Dynamic Existence Presentism (DEP). DEP is founded on two main principles: there are no (discrete) times and temporal existence is fundamentally dynamic. Rejecting the notion of time as a series of static slices, DEP builds on Merricks' (2007) and Tallant's (2014) arguments that presence equates to existence, thereby dissolving the need for a distinct present moment. DEP further distinguishes between the passage of time and temporal dynamism, accepting the latter as an irreducible aspect of reality. The mechanism of DEP's dynamism is rooted in a Neo-Aristotelian powers ontology, positing that all properties are dynamic and process-like. According to DEP, objects are bundles of powerful properties, intrinsically dynamic and inseparable from their properties. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T21:01:57Z |
| format | Thesis (University of Nottingham only) |
| id | nottingham-78602 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T21:01:57Z |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-786022024-12-10T04:40:03Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/78602/ Presentism as dynamic existence Langsdale, Kerry This thesis proposes and defends a novel version of presentism called Dynamic Existence Presentism (DEP). DEP is founded on two main principles: there are no (discrete) times and temporal existence is fundamentally dynamic. Rejecting the notion of time as a series of static slices, DEP builds on Merricks' (2007) and Tallant's (2014) arguments that presence equates to existence, thereby dissolving the need for a distinct present moment. DEP further distinguishes between the passage of time and temporal dynamism, accepting the latter as an irreducible aspect of reality. The mechanism of DEP's dynamism is rooted in a Neo-Aristotelian powers ontology, positing that all properties are dynamic and process-like. According to DEP, objects are bundles of powerful properties, intrinsically dynamic and inseparable from their properties. 2024-12-10 Thesis (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en cc_by https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/78602/1/Langsdale%2C%20Kerry%2C%2014342697%2C%20Corrections.pdf Langsdale, Kerry (2024) Presentism as dynamic existence. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham. Presentism dynamism time temporal existence temporal dynamism. |
| spellingShingle | Presentism dynamism time temporal existence temporal dynamism. Langsdale, Kerry Presentism as dynamic existence |
| title | Presentism as dynamic existence |
| title_full | Presentism as dynamic existence |
| title_fullStr | Presentism as dynamic existence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Presentism as dynamic existence |
| title_short | Presentism as dynamic existence |
| title_sort | presentism as dynamic existence |
| topic | Presentism dynamism time temporal existence temporal dynamism. |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/78602/ |