Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians: Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge
This thesis offers three novel accounts on three different topics that fall under Aristotle’s account of happiness and flourishing. In Part I, I reinterpret the function argument (NE I 7) to provide an answer to the long-standing question: why does Aristotle identify happiness with only theoretic...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Thesis (University of Nottingham only) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2023
|
| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/72166/ |
| _version_ | 1848800721829363712 |
|---|---|
| author | Çetinkaya, Janset Özün |
| author_facet | Çetinkaya, Janset Özün |
| author_sort | Çetinkaya, Janset Özün |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This thesis offers three novel accounts on three different topics that fall under Aristotle’s account of happiness and flourishing.
In Part I, I reinterpret the function argument (NE I 7) to provide an answer to the long-standing question: why does Aristotle identify happiness with only theoretical and practical wisdom? I claim that Aristotle constructs his function argument, whereby he establishes what is good for humans, with his metaphysics in mind. I argue that two metaphysical notions (human essence, human propria) enter the function argument implicitly and that for Aristotle, there is a metaphysically-ordered relation (metaphysical grounding) between four items in the function argument: human essence, human function, human propria, and human good. Building on these claims, I explain the grounds on which Aristotle restricts the human good to theoretical and practical wisdom despite identifying the human function with rational activities in general.
In Part II, I reinterpret three types of friendship (NE VIII-IX) by inquiring into two new topics which have not been addressed in the literature, nor explicitly raised by Aristotle in his writings: could it be the case that for Aristotle, particular agent-based qualities figure prominently in all types of friendships, and if so, how can two parties become philoi and form philia? I claim that there is a common structural similarity between all types of friendship in virtue of being subsumed under the phenomenon of philia. I argue that in all types of friendship, particular agent-based qualities explain some features related to these common characteristics. Building on this, I develop the view that friends focus on each other’s particular agent-based qualities in a certain way to become philos and form philia.
In Part III, I explicate the relation between self-knowledge and character friendship (NE IX 4, 9; MM II 15; EE VII 12) discussion of which has recently gained popularity among scholars. I claim that the relation can be best captured by a non-standard account of self-knowledge which is implicit in Aristotle. I argue that virtuous people already have self-knowledge and they employ it in attributing themselves prohairetic agency by making and acting on their prohairetic choices. I further argue that character friends contribute to their existing level of self-knowledge by making each other aware of their skills and qualities that constitute their particular virtue. I claim that in this way, they become aware of a new layer of their prohairetic agency by realising a new aspect of their disposition that will be manifest in a different circumstance. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:56:04Z |
| format | Thesis (University of Nottingham only) |
| id | nottingham-72166 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:56:04Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-721662025-07-20T04:30:07Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/72166/ Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians: Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge Çetinkaya, Janset Özün This thesis offers three novel accounts on three different topics that fall under Aristotle’s account of happiness and flourishing. In Part I, I reinterpret the function argument (NE I 7) to provide an answer to the long-standing question: why does Aristotle identify happiness with only theoretical and practical wisdom? I claim that Aristotle constructs his function argument, whereby he establishes what is good for humans, with his metaphysics in mind. I argue that two metaphysical notions (human essence, human propria) enter the function argument implicitly and that for Aristotle, there is a metaphysically-ordered relation (metaphysical grounding) between four items in the function argument: human essence, human function, human propria, and human good. Building on these claims, I explain the grounds on which Aristotle restricts the human good to theoretical and practical wisdom despite identifying the human function with rational activities in general. In Part II, I reinterpret three types of friendship (NE VIII-IX) by inquiring into two new topics which have not been addressed in the literature, nor explicitly raised by Aristotle in his writings: could it be the case that for Aristotle, particular agent-based qualities figure prominently in all types of friendships, and if so, how can two parties become philoi and form philia? I claim that there is a common structural similarity between all types of friendship in virtue of being subsumed under the phenomenon of philia. I argue that in all types of friendship, particular agent-based qualities explain some features related to these common characteristics. Building on this, I develop the view that friends focus on each other’s particular agent-based qualities in a certain way to become philos and form philia. In Part III, I explicate the relation between self-knowledge and character friendship (NE IX 4, 9; MM II 15; EE VII 12) discussion of which has recently gained popularity among scholars. I claim that the relation can be best captured by a non-standard account of self-knowledge which is implicit in Aristotle. I argue that virtuous people already have self-knowledge and they employ it in attributing themselves prohairetic agency by making and acting on their prohairetic choices. I further argue that character friends contribute to their existing level of self-knowledge by making each other aware of their skills and qualities that constitute their particular virtue. I claim that in this way, they become aware of a new layer of their prohairetic agency by realising a new aspect of their disposition that will be manifest in a different circumstance. 2023-07-20 Thesis (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en cc_by https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/72166/1/PhD%20thesis_Revised%20version.pdf Çetinkaya, Janset Özün (2023) Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians: Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham. |
| spellingShingle | Çetinkaya, Janset Özün Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians: Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge |
| title | Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians:
Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge |
| title_full | Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians:
Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge |
| title_fullStr | Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians:
Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians:
Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge |
| title_short | Reinterpreting Aristotle in light of neo-Aristotelians:
Function, Friendship, and Self-Knowledge |
| title_sort | reinterpreting aristotle in light of neo-aristotelians:
function, friendship, and self-knowledge |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/72166/ |