Do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: Evidence from SOEs in China

In the background of China's unique transition economy, this study selects the listed state-owned enterprises in China from 2012 to 2021 as a sample. The main objective of this research will be to reveal the impact of the chairman's political promotion incentive on the inefficient investme...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Han, Yuntong
Format: Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
Language:English
Published: 2022
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/70485/
_version_ 1848800619993759744
author Han, Yuntong
author_facet Han, Yuntong
author_sort Han, Yuntong
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description In the background of China's unique transition economy, this study selects the listed state-owned enterprises in China from 2012 to 2021 as a sample. The main objective of this research will be to reveal the impact of the chairman's political promotion incentive on the inefficient investment of state-owned enterprises, as well as the adjustment effect of the chairman's equity incentive and the state-owned enterprise equity mix on this impact. Based on principal-agent, information asymmetry and government intervention theory, this study performs systematic GMM estimation and multiple regression by constructing panel data models. The empirical results show that the chairman's political promotion incentive will increase the inefficient investment in state-owned enterprises, while the higher equity incentive and the proportion of state-owned shares will curb this impact. In conclusion, this study finds that when the political promotion incentives are significant, the chairmen prefer to obtain the promotion opportunity by achieving the political goals and thus deviate from the optimal investment decision, leading to inefficient investment in the state-owned enterprises.
first_indexed 2025-11-14T20:54:27Z
format Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
id nottingham-70485
institution University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus
institution_category Local University
language English
last_indexed 2025-11-14T20:54:27Z
publishDate 2022
recordtype eprints
repository_type Digital Repository
spelling nottingham-704852023-07-06T11:58:59Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/70485/ Do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: Evidence from SOEs in China Han, Yuntong In the background of China's unique transition economy, this study selects the listed state-owned enterprises in China from 2012 to 2021 as a sample. The main objective of this research will be to reveal the impact of the chairman's political promotion incentive on the inefficient investment of state-owned enterprises, as well as the adjustment effect of the chairman's equity incentive and the state-owned enterprise equity mix on this impact. Based on principal-agent, information asymmetry and government intervention theory, this study performs systematic GMM estimation and multiple regression by constructing panel data models. The empirical results show that the chairman's political promotion incentive will increase the inefficient investment in state-owned enterprises, while the higher equity incentive and the proportion of state-owned shares will curb this impact. In conclusion, this study finds that when the political promotion incentives are significant, the chairmen prefer to obtain the promotion opportunity by achieving the political goals and thus deviate from the optimal investment decision, leading to inefficient investment in the state-owned enterprises. 2022-09-08 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/70485/1/20222859_BUSI4020_2021_22.pdf Han, Yuntong (2022) Do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: Evidence from SOEs in China. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)]
spellingShingle Han, Yuntong
Do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: Evidence from SOEs in China
title Do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: Evidence from SOEs in China
title_full Do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: Evidence from SOEs in China
title_fullStr Do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: Evidence from SOEs in China
title_full_unstemmed Do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: Evidence from SOEs in China
title_short Do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: Evidence from SOEs in China
title_sort do the chairman's political promotion incentive influence the investment efficiency: evidence from soes in china
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/70485/