Make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in Chinese private target acquisitions

The valuation adjustment mechanism (VAM) is a contingent-payment contractual arrangement used in the Chinese mergers and acquisitions (M&As) market. The ‘two-direction payment’ design of Chinese VAMs can reduce deal uncertainty and generate value, especially for poorly performing companies that...

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Main Author: Bi, Xiaogang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Routledge 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/65093/
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author Bi, Xiaogang
author_facet Bi, Xiaogang
author_sort Bi, Xiaogang
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description The valuation adjustment mechanism (VAM) is a contingent-payment contractual arrangement used in the Chinese mergers and acquisitions (M&As) market. The ‘two-direction payment’ design of Chinese VAMs can reduce deal uncertainty and generate value, especially for poorly performing companies that can use VAM contracts to boost short-term performance. I find in this empirical investigation that acquirers applying VAM terms have significantly higher market returns after addressing endogeneity. I also document that poorly performing bidders sign larger VAM contracts, pay higher bid premiums and achieve higher operating performance, and which types of firms are more likely to adopt a VAM in transactions.
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spelling nottingham-650932021-04-12T06:49:31Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/65093/ Make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in Chinese private target acquisitions Bi, Xiaogang The valuation adjustment mechanism (VAM) is a contingent-payment contractual arrangement used in the Chinese mergers and acquisitions (M&As) market. The ‘two-direction payment’ design of Chinese VAMs can reduce deal uncertainty and generate value, especially for poorly performing companies that can use VAM contracts to boost short-term performance. I find in this empirical investigation that acquirers applying VAM terms have significantly higher market returns after addressing endogeneity. I also document that poorly performing bidders sign larger VAM contracts, pay higher bid premiums and achieve higher operating performance, and which types of firms are more likely to adopt a VAM in transactions. Routledge 2021-03-25 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en cc_by https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/65093/1/Make%20a%20promise%20the%20valuation%20adjustment%20mechanism%20in%20Chinese%20private%20target%20acquisitions.pdf Bi, Xiaogang (2021) Make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in Chinese private target acquisitions. The European Journal of Finance . pp. 1-24. ISSN 1351-847X Valuation adjustment mechanism; mergers and acquisitions; takeovers; contract design; contingent payment http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2021.1903963 doi:10.1080/1351847X.2021.1903963 doi:10.1080/1351847X.2021.1903963
spellingShingle Valuation adjustment mechanism; mergers and acquisitions; takeovers; contract design; contingent payment
Bi, Xiaogang
Make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in Chinese private target acquisitions
title Make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in Chinese private target acquisitions
title_full Make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in Chinese private target acquisitions
title_fullStr Make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in Chinese private target acquisitions
title_full_unstemmed Make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in Chinese private target acquisitions
title_short Make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in Chinese private target acquisitions
title_sort make a promise: the valuation adjustment mechanism in chinese private target acquisitions
topic Valuation adjustment mechanism; mergers and acquisitions; takeovers; contract design; contingent payment
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/65093/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/65093/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/65093/