| Summary: | The aim of this dissertation is to provide an insightful understanding of executive compensation and its determinants in Chinese listed firms. It tests whether company performance is positively associated with executive pay. Additionally, it explores the impacts of corporate governance structure on managerial pay in China.
Using a sample of 848 Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2016, this study indicates that both corporate accounting-based performance and stock market-based performance have a positive influence on executive pay. The empirical findings of this thesis also show that as for the board of directors, the size of a board of directors and CEO duality are both positively linked to executive pay, while there is no correlation between board independence and managerial pay. Besides, the level of executive pay in firms with a remuneration committee is lower. Finally, regarding ownership structure, ownership concentration is shown to be negatively associated with executive pay, while state control is significantly positively related to managerial remuneration.
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