An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Risk in the Banking Industry

The following study investigates whether Enforcement Actions placed on banks for misbehaving, have a significant effect on their Cumulative Abnormal Returns or not. Considering a sample of 103 US Canadian banks for the period 2010-2018, I have observed that such actions levied by the Federal Deposit...

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Main Author: Karletides, GK
Format: Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
Language:English
Published: 2018
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/53838/
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author Karletides, GK
author_facet Karletides, GK
author_sort Karletides, GK
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description The following study investigates whether Enforcement Actions placed on banks for misbehaving, have a significant effect on their Cumulative Abnormal Returns or not. Considering a sample of 103 US Canadian banks for the period 2010-2018, I have observed that such actions levied by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the National Credit Union Administration will lead to a significant reduction in the share price of banks. Utilising a regression, I have provided evidence that the severity and type of enforcement actions will not play a major role in the abnormal returns of banks however, several banks characteristics will be the main determinants whether those banks will be affected from the enforcement actions or not. The results of this study present significant insights regarding the effects of EAs, which mostly agree with previous literature that suggests that the actions levied on banks will reduce the returns of banks leading to the formation of some issues. Finally, it can be observed that, in this study severe actions such as Cease, and Desists Orders, Prompt Corrective Actions and Formal Agreements/ Consent Orders dominate the observations number since the data range is placed just after the crisis where actions taken to prevent misconduct were much more severe and larger in number.
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spelling nottingham-538382022-02-21T16:31:08Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/53838/ An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Risk in the Banking Industry Karletides, GK The following study investigates whether Enforcement Actions placed on banks for misbehaving, have a significant effect on their Cumulative Abnormal Returns or not. Considering a sample of 103 US Canadian banks for the period 2010-2018, I have observed that such actions levied by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the National Credit Union Administration will lead to a significant reduction in the share price of banks. Utilising a regression, I have provided evidence that the severity and type of enforcement actions will not play a major role in the abnormal returns of banks however, several banks characteristics will be the main determinants whether those banks will be affected from the enforcement actions or not. The results of this study present significant insights regarding the effects of EAs, which mostly agree with previous literature that suggests that the actions levied on banks will reduce the returns of banks leading to the formation of some issues. Finally, it can be observed that, in this study severe actions such as Cease, and Desists Orders, Prompt Corrective Actions and Formal Agreements/ Consent Orders dominate the observations number since the data range is placed just after the crisis where actions taken to prevent misconduct were much more severe and larger in number. 2018-12-01 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/53838/1/Dissertation%20Giorgos%20Karletides.pdf Karletides, GK (2018) An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Risk in the Banking Industry. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)]
spellingShingle Karletides, GK
An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Risk in the Banking Industry
title An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Risk in the Banking Industry
title_full An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Risk in the Banking Industry
title_fullStr An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Risk in the Banking Industry
title_full_unstemmed An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Risk in the Banking Industry
title_short An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Risk in the Banking Industry
title_sort empirical analysis of regulatory risk in the banking industry
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/53838/