Market reaction to bank liquidity regulation

We measure market reactions to announcements concerning liquidity regulation, a key innovation in the Basel framework. Our initial results show that liquidity regulation attracts negative abnormal returns. However, the price responses are less pronounced when coinciding announcements concerning capi...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Bruno, Brunella, Onali, Enrico, Schaeck, Klaus
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press 2018
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52499/
_version_ 1848798740676083712
author Bruno, Brunella
Onali, Enrico
Schaeck, Klaus
author_facet Bruno, Brunella
Onali, Enrico
Schaeck, Klaus
author_sort Bruno, Brunella
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description We measure market reactions to announcements concerning liquidity regulation, a key innovation in the Basel framework. Our initial results show that liquidity regulation attracts negative abnormal returns. However, the price responses are less pronounced when coinciding announcements concerning capital regulation are backed out, suggesting that markets do not consider liquidity regulation to be binding. Bank- and country-specific characteristics also matter. Liquid balance sheets and high charter values increase abnormal returns whereas smaller long-term funding mismatches reduce abnormal returns. Banks located in countries with large government debt and tight interbank conditions or with prior domestic liquidity regulation display lower abnormal returns.
first_indexed 2025-11-14T20:24:35Z
format Article
id nottingham-52499
institution University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus
institution_category Local University
last_indexed 2025-11-14T20:24:35Z
publishDate 2018
publisher Cambridge University Press
recordtype eprints
repository_type Digital Repository
spelling nottingham-524992020-05-04T19:34:12Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52499/ Market reaction to bank liquidity regulation Bruno, Brunella Onali, Enrico Schaeck, Klaus We measure market reactions to announcements concerning liquidity regulation, a key innovation in the Basel framework. Our initial results show that liquidity regulation attracts negative abnormal returns. However, the price responses are less pronounced when coinciding announcements concerning capital regulation are backed out, suggesting that markets do not consider liquidity regulation to be binding. Bank- and country-specific characteristics also matter. Liquid balance sheets and high charter values increase abnormal returns whereas smaller long-term funding mismatches reduce abnormal returns. Banks located in countries with large government debt and tight interbank conditions or with prior domestic liquidity regulation display lower abnormal returns. Cambridge University Press 2018-04-30 Article PeerReviewed Bruno, Brunella, Onali, Enrico and Schaeck, Klaus (2018) Market reaction to bank liquidity regulation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53 (02). pp. 899-935. ISSN 1756-6916 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/market-reaction-to-bank-liquidity-regulation/B1E0832663AC0854937B0470BD658A1F doi:10.1017/S0022109017001089 doi:10.1017/S0022109017001089
spellingShingle Bruno, Brunella
Onali, Enrico
Schaeck, Klaus
Market reaction to bank liquidity regulation
title Market reaction to bank liquidity regulation
title_full Market reaction to bank liquidity regulation
title_fullStr Market reaction to bank liquidity regulation
title_full_unstemmed Market reaction to bank liquidity regulation
title_short Market reaction to bank liquidity regulation
title_sort market reaction to bank liquidity regulation
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52499/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52499/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52499/