The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions

We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse...

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Main Authors: Danisewicz, Piotr, McGowan, Danny, Onali, Enrico, Schaeck, Klaus
Format: Article
Published: Elsevier 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52483/
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author Danisewicz, Piotr
McGowan, Danny
Onali, Enrico
Schaeck, Klaus
author_facet Danisewicz, Piotr
McGowan, Danny
Onali, Enrico
Schaeck, Klaus
author_sort Danisewicz, Piotr
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.
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publishDate 2016
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spelling nottingham-524832020-05-04T18:15:09Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52483/ The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions Danisewicz, Piotr McGowan, Danny Onali, Enrico Schaeck, Klaus We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence. Elsevier 2016-10-27 Article PeerReviewed Danisewicz, Piotr, McGowan, Danny, Onali, Enrico and Schaeck, Klaus (2016) The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions. Journal of Financial Intermediation . ISSN 1042-9573 Macro-financial linkages; Real effects; Economic growth; Supervision; Enforcement actions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S104295731630050X doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003 doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003
spellingShingle Macro-financial linkages; Real effects; Economic growth; Supervision; Enforcement actions
Danisewicz, Piotr
McGowan, Danny
Onali, Enrico
Schaeck, Klaus
The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions
title The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions
title_full The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions
title_fullStr The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions
title_full_unstemmed The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions
title_short The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions
title_sort real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions
topic Macro-financial linkages; Real effects; Economic growth; Supervision; Enforcement actions
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52483/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52483/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52483/