The new Aristotelian essentialists

In recent years largely due to the seminal work of Kit Fine and that of Jonathan Lowe there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept of essence and the project of explaining de re necessity in terms of it. Of course, Quine rejected what he called Aristotelian essentialism in his battle again...

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Main Author: Noonan, Harold
Format: Article
Published: De Gruyter 2018
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Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52137/
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author Noonan, Harold
author_facet Noonan, Harold
author_sort Noonan, Harold
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
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description In recent years largely due to the seminal work of Kit Fine and that of Jonathan Lowe there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept of essence and the project of explaining de re necessity in terms of it. Of course, Quine rejected what he called Aristotelian essentialism in his battle against quantified modal logic. But what he and Kripke debated was a notion of essence defined in terms of de re necessity. The new Aristotelian essentialists regard essence as entailing but prior in the order of explanation to de re necessity. In what follows I argue that the concept of essence so understood has not been adequately explained and that any attempt to explain it, at least along the lines most familiar from the literature, must be flagrantly circular or make use of de re modal notions.
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spelling nottingham-521372020-05-04T19:53:34Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52137/ The new Aristotelian essentialists Noonan, Harold In recent years largely due to the seminal work of Kit Fine and that of Jonathan Lowe there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept of essence and the project of explaining de re necessity in terms of it. Of course, Quine rejected what he called Aristotelian essentialism in his battle against quantified modal logic. But what he and Kripke debated was a notion of essence defined in terms of de re necessity. The new Aristotelian essentialists regard essence as entailing but prior in the order of explanation to de re necessity. In what follows I argue that the concept of essence so understood has not been adequately explained and that any attempt to explain it, at least along the lines most familiar from the literature, must be flagrantly circular or make use of de re modal notions. De Gruyter 2018 Article PeerReviewed Noonan, Harold (2018) The new Aristotelian essentialists. Metaphysica, 19 (1). pp. 87-94. ISSN 1437-2053 essentialism; de dicto necessity; de re necessity; sortal concepts https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/mp.2018.19.issue-1/mp-2018-0004/mp-2018-0004.xml doi:10.1515/mp-2018-0004 doi:10.1515/mp-2018-0004
spellingShingle essentialism; de dicto necessity; de re necessity; sortal concepts
Noonan, Harold
The new Aristotelian essentialists
title The new Aristotelian essentialists
title_full The new Aristotelian essentialists
title_fullStr The new Aristotelian essentialists
title_full_unstemmed The new Aristotelian essentialists
title_short The new Aristotelian essentialists
title_sort new aristotelian essentialists
topic essentialism; de dicto necessity; de re necessity; sortal concepts
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52137/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52137/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52137/