Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA
Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh...
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| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis
2018
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51659/ |
| _version_ | 1848798544450813952 |
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| author | Maiorano, Diego Das, Upasak Masiero, Silvia |
| author_facet | Maiorano, Diego Das, Upasak Masiero, Silvia |
| author_sort | Maiorano, Diego |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:21:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-51659 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:21:27Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Taylor & Francis |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-516592020-05-04T19:35:02Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51659/ Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA Maiorano, Diego Das, Upasak Masiero, Silvia Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP. Taylor & Francis 2018-05-02 Article PeerReviewed Maiorano, Diego, Das, Upasak and Masiero, Silvia (2018) Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA. Oxford Development Studies . pp. 1-14. ISSN 1469-9966 India; MGNREGA; clientelism; incentives; implementation; decentralisation; politics https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13600818.2018.1467391 doi:10.1080/13600818.2018.1467391 doi:10.1080/13600818.2018.1467391 |
| spellingShingle | India; MGNREGA; clientelism; incentives; implementation; decentralisation; politics Maiorano, Diego Das, Upasak Masiero, Silvia Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA |
| title | Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA |
| title_full | Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA |
| title_fullStr | Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA |
| title_full_unstemmed | Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA |
| title_short | Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA |
| title_sort | decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of india’s mgnrega |
| topic | India; MGNREGA; clientelism; incentives; implementation; decentralisation; politics |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51659/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51659/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51659/ |