Insider trading and financing constraints

Insider trading may alleviate financing constraints by conveying value‐relevant information to the market (the information effect) or may exacerbate financing constraints by impairing market liquidity and distorting insiders’ incentives to disclose value‐relevant information (the confidence effect)....

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Main Authors: Ataullah, Ali, Goergen, Marc, Le, Hang
Format: Article
Published: Wiley 2014
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50671/
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author Ataullah, Ali
Goergen, Marc
Le, Hang
author_facet Ataullah, Ali
Goergen, Marc
Le, Hang
author_sort Ataullah, Ali
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description Insider trading may alleviate financing constraints by conveying value‐relevant information to the market (the information effect) or may exacerbate financing constraints by impairing market liquidity and distorting insiders’ incentives to disclose value‐relevant information (the confidence effect). We examine the significance of these two contrasting effects by investigating the link between insider trading and financing constraints as measured by the investment‐cash flow sensitivity. We find that, overall insider trading exacerbates financing constraints; however the information effect dominates the confidence effect for insider purchases. Only trades by executive directors are significantly related to financing constraints.
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spelling nottingham-506712020-05-04T16:55:42Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50671/ Insider trading and financing constraints Ataullah, Ali Goergen, Marc Le, Hang Insider trading may alleviate financing constraints by conveying value‐relevant information to the market (the information effect) or may exacerbate financing constraints by impairing market liquidity and distorting insiders’ incentives to disclose value‐relevant information (the confidence effect). We examine the significance of these two contrasting effects by investigating the link between insider trading and financing constraints as measured by the investment‐cash flow sensitivity. We find that, overall insider trading exacerbates financing constraints; however the information effect dominates the confidence effect for insider purchases. Only trades by executive directors are significantly related to financing constraints. Wiley 2014-10-16 Article PeerReviewed Ataullah, Ali, Goergen, Marc and Le, Hang (2014) Insider trading and financing constraints. Financial Review, 49 (4). pp. 685-712. ISSN 1540-6288 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/fire.12053 doi:10.1111/fire.12053 doi:10.1111/fire.12053
spellingShingle Ataullah, Ali
Goergen, Marc
Le, Hang
Insider trading and financing constraints
title Insider trading and financing constraints
title_full Insider trading and financing constraints
title_fullStr Insider trading and financing constraints
title_full_unstemmed Insider trading and financing constraints
title_short Insider trading and financing constraints
title_sort insider trading and financing constraints
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50671/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50671/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50671/