Efficiency versus equality in bargaining
We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earnings outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoid an equal and Pareto efficie...
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press
2018
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50482/ |
| _version_ | 1848798262096560128 |
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| author | Galeotti, Fabio Montero, Maria Poulsen, Anders |
| author_facet | Galeotti, Fabio Montero, Maria Poulsen, Anders |
| author_sort | Galeotti, Fabio |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earnings outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoid an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:16:58Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-50482 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:16:58Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-504822020-05-04T19:40:20Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50482/ Efficiency versus equality in bargaining Galeotti, Fabio Montero, Maria Poulsen, Anders We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earnings outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoid an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. Oxford University Press 2018-06-13 Article PeerReviewed Galeotti, Fabio, Montero, Maria and Poulsen, Anders (2018) Efficiency versus equality in bargaining. Journal of the European Economic Association . ISSN 1542-4774 bargaining efficiency equality communication experiment independence of irrelevant alternatives https://academic.oup.com/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvy030/5088947 doi:10.1093/jeea/jvy030 doi:10.1093/jeea/jvy030 |
| spellingShingle | bargaining efficiency equality communication experiment independence of irrelevant alternatives Galeotti, Fabio Montero, Maria Poulsen, Anders Efficiency versus equality in bargaining |
| title | Efficiency versus equality in bargaining |
| title_full | Efficiency versus equality in bargaining |
| title_fullStr | Efficiency versus equality in bargaining |
| title_full_unstemmed | Efficiency versus equality in bargaining |
| title_short | Efficiency versus equality in bargaining |
| title_sort | efficiency versus equality in bargaining |
| topic | bargaining efficiency equality communication experiment independence of irrelevant alternatives |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50482/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50482/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50482/ |